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Abstract 
Western political philosophy owes a great debt to social contractualism. In particular, the liberal 
tradition that is often lauded as a guarantee of justice, liberty, and equality for all finds its roots 
in the social contracts of John Locke and Jean Jaques Rousseau, and later, John Rawls. Yet the 
implications that each of these social contracts have for race is troubling, even as the social 
construct of race emerges and develops throughout time. I argue that each of these social 
contracts perpetuates a given understanding of race that creates subordinating dynamics between 
white and non-white individuals. Specifically, Locke’s proto-racialized contract excludes non-
Europeans from personhood on the basis of labor and rationality; Rousseau’s racialized contract 
excludes non-Europeans from full personhood on the basis of climate and civilizational potential; 
and Rawls’ neoliberal social contract allows for the neglect of entrenched inequalities. I argue 
that understanding the racialized underpinnings of one aspect of western political philosophy is 
one of many steps necessary to establishing a theoretical framework for government, social 
institutions, and the legal field that is not based on subordination.  
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Process Analysis 
For my senior honors thesis, I chose to do a research project regarding the racial 
implications of the three social contract theories that have contributed most prominently to 
western, liberal political thought. That is, I analyzed and explored the social contracts of John 
Locke, Jean Jaques Rousseau, and John Rawls. I argued that each contract creates a 
subordinating racial dynamic between white individuals and non-white individuals, while doing 
so in different ways and interacting with the emergent concept of race in differing manners. 
Throughout this project, I closely analyzed the relevant works by these three philosophers, drew 
upon critical race theorists, and interacted with objecting scholars. 
I first had the idea for this project in my history of modern philosophy class. This class 
gave me the opportunity to do close readings of Locke and Rousseau and their respective social 
contract theories. As I read the Second Treatise and the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 
and talked through them with my classmates, I came to the conclusion that both Locke and 
Rousseau had troubling ideas about non-Europeans and that their social contracts helped to 
perpetuate these ideas. I wrote my final research paper in this class on the racial implications of 
Locke’s social contract, interacting somewhat with critical race theory by drawing upon the work 
of Charles Mills. I knew I wanted to do further research into the racialization of Locke’s 
contract, in addition to other philosophers prominent in the tradition of western, liberal political 
thought. 
I specifically chose this philosophical tradition because it is one that is often cited as 
providing a theoretical basis for the government, social institutions, and legal system of the 
United States. Regardless of whether the United States actually can be considered liberal, I 
believe that it is useful to explore and analyze the philosophical underpinning many have 
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claimed for the country. That way, divergences between theory and reality can be identified. This 
also makes it possible to determine whether this theoretical basis is even desirable. 
Consequently, I decided to expand my focus from just Locke to also include Rousseau 
and Rawls. Each of these philosophers has provided some influence on American liberalism. 
Locke is often cited as an inspiration for the founders of American government, Rousseau’s 
philosophy has sometimes been appropriated as a way for disadvantaged communities to 
navigate liberalism, and Rawls is credited with reviving American political thought and 
influencing many contemporary politicians and thinkers.  
I began my research process by doing close readings of the relevant works of these 
philosophers: Locke’s Second Treatise, Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and 
Social Contract, and Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. I supplemented these readings with other works 
from these authors, such as Locke’s Fundamental Constitutions of the Carolinas and portions of 
Rawls’ Political Liberalism. While I read the works I would be analyzing, I also read existing 
scholarship regarding these works. This gave me the opportunity to read and enjoy the arguments 
of some leading contemporary philosophers, such as Bernard Boxhill, Tommie Shelby, and 
Naomi Zack. 
I additionally familiarized myself with critical race theory and the philosophy of race. I 
read more of Charles Mills’ writings in addition to works by Sylvia Wynter, Robert Bernasconi, 
Anika Maaza Mann, Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze, and Naomi Zack. I found this portion of my 
research to be especially invaluable, as no classes on critical race theory were available to me 
before I began my thesis. I was mostly ignorant about this important branch of scholarship, and I 
most likely would have remained so had it not been for this project and for the assistance of my 
advisors.  
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My primary advisor, Dr. Vandiver, encouraged me to develop the methodological 
approach proposed by Quentin Skinner. This approach suggests that the best way to understand a 
text is to understand the context in which it was written, so that a text is considered neither in a 
vacuum nor as just a reworking of a previously conceived idea. Working with this methodology 
was the greatest learning curve for me—I had never consciously worked under any defined 
methodology, and I had no idea what additional research this would entail or how this would 
impact my argumentation.  
I navigated my uncertainty through trial and error. The first draft of the first chapter on 
Locke was bad, but after gaining a better understanding of the types of research that would most 
benefit my project, I was able to improve both the structure and the content of my writing. I read 
several primary sources that were contemporary to each of the contractualists I was discussing so 
that I could better understand and establish why they may have thought the things that they did. 
To that end, I read John Smith’s travelog and Francis Bacon’s pseudo-anthropological analysis 
of all living beings to inform my writing about Locke. I read travelogs and more pseudo-
anthropology from French explorers and missionaries to establish the context in which Rousseau 
wrote. Finally, I read contemporary discourse on the status of racial inequalities in the United 
States and drew upon my own conversations to describe the world in which Rawls wrote and is 
read. 
While I enjoy hunting for pieces to historical puzzles, reading philosophy, and writing in 
general, there were many times when this process was exhausting. This thesis is roughly ninety 
pages and has taken about a year to write. There were times when I lacked the energy or the will 
to write, or times when I could not write well, or times when I was prevented from writing at all. 
I missed plenty of writing deadlines. I have worried about completing the project and producing 
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quality work. Yet this process has also been highly beneficial—I believe I have become a much 
stronger writer, researcher, and thinker because of this. While this process has not been easy, the 
knowledge and skills I have gained are beyond invaluable.  
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Introduction 
In front of me sit three books. The first, an American geography textbook from the mid-
1800s, is so tattered that I am afraid the cover will crumble when I open it. The second is a book 
on intellectual history I was supposed to read for a history class in high school, looking brand-
new from lack of use. The final book is a loose-leaf textbook purporting to cover the history of 
the west in the world, left on my kitchen island by a friend who is considering using it in a class 
she teaches.  
The geography textbook, Mitchell’s New School Geography, was published just after the 
Civil War.1 It is divided into sections on physical, political, and descriptive geography, 
accompanied by two hundred impressively-detailed engravings. “Political geography” is founded 
on the notion that there are distinct, separate races of people. The book identifies five— “the 
Caucasian, or White race; the Mongolian, or Yellow race; the African, or Black race; the Malay, 
or Brown race; and the American, or Red race.”2 The book then lists descriptions of each of the 
categorizations. The Caucasian race is considered to be “the most improved and intelligent of the 
human family, and seems capable of attaining the highest degree of progress and civilization.”3 
The Mongolian race is “patient and industrious, but limited in genius and slow in progress.”4 The 
African race is “strong and active in body, but indolent in habit, and have not attained to any 
high degree of civilization.”5 The Malay race is “fierce and revengeful in disposition, and have 
made but little progress in civilization.” The American race is “tall and well formed, but 
revengeful and warlike. They are fast disappearing before the progress of white civilization.”6  
                                                 
1 S. Augustus Mitchell, Mitchell’s New School Geography (Philadelphia: E. H. Butler & Co., 1868). I am grateful to 
my literature professor, Dr. Joyce Huff, for allowing me to access and photograph her original copy of this textbook.  
2 Mitchell, Geography, 32. 
3 Mitchell, Geography, 33. 
4 Mitchell, Geography, 33. 
5 Mitchell, Geography, 34.  
6 Mitchell, Geography, 34. 
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Many people today may look at these ideas and correctly identify them as racist. It should 
not be a surprise that there were racist thinkers in the 1800s, but surely that is a thing of the past. 
Mainstream, contemporary works of political thought and mainstream, contemporary educational 
materials don’t support such abhorrent ideas. Right? 
The second book, assigned for reading in my high school Advanced Placement European 
History class, is Charles Van Doren’s A History of Knowledge—the cover touts it as a summary 
of “the pivotal events, people, and achievements of world history.”7 “World history” turns out to 
be overwhelming European—only the following non-European/non-European descended 
historical figures receive more than a page’s worth of material: Avicenna, St. Augustine, 
Cleopatra, Confucius, Jesus Christ, Kublai Khan, and Shih Huang-ti.8 It is somewhat odd that a 
book covering significant ideas and knowledge, with a quarter of its pages dedicated to the 20th 
century alone, does not ever mention thinkers such as Gandhi or Martin Luther King.  
The third book, The Impact of Western Civilization on World History, is a high school 
level textbook edited by a professor at my university. It is a “succinct outline of Western history 
and its affect [sic] on the world from the time of the ancient Greeks and Romans to the present.”9 
The book contains two chapters on European expansion, entitled “An Explosion of Travel: The 
Fifteenth Century and Beyond” and “Building Empires 1830-1913.” Yet we find no more than a 
cursory, almost euphemistic acknowledgement of the race-based, chattel slavery that began to 
develop in the fifteenth century or the European imperialism that characterized the nineteenth 
century. Instead, the first mentioned chapter states that “European travel pushed out in new 
directions, and this soon involved travel—some voluntary, some forced—by people in other 
                                                 
7 Charles Van Doren, A History of Knowledge, New York: Ballantine Books, 1991. 
8 Van Doren, History of Knowledge, 413-22. 
9 The Impact of Western Civilization on World History, ed. Scott Parkinson (San Diego: Cognella Academic 
Publishing, 2015). 
 7 
regions as well.”10 The chapter contains one additional mention of slavery11 and one of 
imperialistic violence,12 both presented as side effects of European exploration and curiosity. The 
second chapter, to its credit, briefly details the violent nature of imperialistic campaigns across 
Africa and the United States, and acknowledges that imperialism is “an attitude that increasingly 
drew on triumphalism, racialism and cultural arrogance.”13  
It is the case that western thought, both in the past and in our present, is often racialized. 
From explicit racism to the exclusion of non-European voices to a gentle glossing-over of certain 
atrocities, racialized thought manifests itself in many different ways, in many different spheres. It 
is especially pernicious in political thought, particularly as the western tradition of liberalism 
promises equality, liberty, and dignity for all—yet has consistently failed to deliver this for all. 
Why is this the case? I argue that the prevailing social contract theories of Locke, Rousseau, and 
Rawls—all crucial contributions to liberalism—have contributed to a racialized political world 
view that explicitly or implicitly prioritizes and privileges whiteness, while simultaneously 
creating and enforcing the social construct of race. 
 
Scholarly Context  
For some time, large groups of mainstream political thinkers have turned a blind eye to the racial 
implications of many of the central concepts of modern, western political philosophy, including 
social contract theory. Previous editions of Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for example, have airily 
                                                 
10 Stephen S. Gosch and Peter N. Stearns, “An Explosion of Travel: The Fifteenth Century and Beyond,” in The 
Impact of Western Civilization on World History, ed. Scott Parkinson (San Diego: Cognella Academic Publishing, 
2015) 134. 
11 Gosch and Stearns, “Explosion of Travel,” 141. 
12 Gosch and Stearns, “Explosion of Travel,” 142. 
13 Jeremy Black, “Building Empires 1830-1913,” in The Impact of Western Civilization on World History, ed. Scott 
Parkinson (San Diego: Cognella Academic Publishing, 2015) 179.  
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glossed over Locke’s defense of slavery by stating that it was but an “inconsistency,” and that it 
“may mercifully be passed over.”14  
Notwithstanding, significant criticism and deconstruction of many canonical 
philosophers, liberalism, and the concept of race has emerged from critical race theory. Critical 
race theory developed in American law schools in the 1980s to address the systemic racial biases 
present in the American justice system. Critical race theorists and scholars of race may 
deconstruct the ideas of specific philosophers, as Charles Mills has done; they may address and 
criticize general concepts and structures, like Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw as done with the 
intersection of gender and race; they may also construct grand narratives to describe history, 
such as Sylvia Wynter has done. In general, many critical race theorists question whether or not 
liberalism and liberal institution can be severed from their white supremacy. All critical race 
theorists acknowledge that race is an arbitrary social construct, created to justify the 
dehumanizing treatment of people of color. I shall further describe and extend these ideas later in 
this work.  
This thesis could not exist without the work of critical race theorists and other 
philosophers of race. Notwithstanding, it tackles a topic that has received relatively little focus: 
the racial implications of the social contract theories of Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls. While 
much has been said about how the rhetorical strategies of these philosophers impact race—by 
constructing it or ignoring it, for instance—there is not a great deal of jscholarship regarding how 
the social contracts themselves shape the construct of race and perceptions of it. I believe Locke, 
Rousseau, and Rawls had racially problematic social contracts. This thesis will seek to uncover 
the different problems that arise from these social contracts, both on paper and in practice.  
                                                 
14 As cited in Jennifer Welchman’s article “Locke on Slavery and Inalienable Rights.” See Jennifer Welchman, 
“Locke on Slavery and Inalienable Rights,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 1 (March 1995): 68. 
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Terms and Ideas 
This project will address these issues. But first, we must establish the meanings of the terms on 
which this project will be built. Defining social contract theory is relatively simple. A social 
contract is an imaginary or actual agreement among people to form a civil society—a society 
with a government. Social contracts may include details about that government, especially 
regarding its relationship to the people of the society, and the obligations the government and the 
people have to each other.15 While the social contracts of Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls 
substantially differ, they all attempt to address these overarching issues and paint a picture of 
what an ideal state looks like. Further details about the specifics of these social contracts will be 
provided in the appropriate sections.  
Describing race, racism, and related terms is a greater challenge, simply because these 
terms mean different things in different contexts and mean different things to different people. Is 
race based solely on the color of someone’s skin, or is it a more abstract concept? Naomi Zack, a 
philosopher of race and historian of philosophy, writes, “The word ‘race’ is ambiguous, 
sometimes referring to skin color, other times to skin color and group history, sometimes to 
biology and genealogy, other times to culture by itself or culture combined with other factors.”16 
As previously mentioned, it has also been argued that race, as a concept, was invented to justify 
the dehumanizing treatment people of color, especially Indigenous Americans, African slaves, 
and their decedents, suffered at the hands of Europeans.  
                                                 
15 “Social Contract Theory,” Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 998.  
16 Naomi Zack, The Ethics and Mores of Race: Equality after the History of Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2011) xviii.  
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This links race to personhood. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, a post-colonial philosopher, 
pinpoints the invention of race as occurring during the Renaissance and Enlightenment, stating 
that the heightened economic, political, and cultural engagements Europe was a part of during 
this time necessitated a shift in Europe’s idea of its place in the world, where ultimately “the 
conception of the African content as dark simultaneously made it possible for Europe to 
articulate its own spaces as enlightened.”17 Thus race developed as a way for European states to 
identify themselves: non-European areas are savage, uncultured, and dark, whereas Europe is the 
opposite.  
Chuckwudi Eze and Charles Mills, a critical race theorist and political philosopher, agree 
that the idea of race developed as a method to separate and solidify European identity. Mills 
further expounds upon this idea by stating that this is the real contract—a “racial contract”18 
where Europeans and their decedents either explicitly or tacitly agree to a system where they are 
privileged socially, economically, and politically above non-white, non-European individuals.19 
A conceptualization of race developed as a result of this contract, at times tied to various aspects 
of society more than other aspects: “Europeans versus non-Europeans (geography), civilized 
versus wild/savage/barbarians (culture), Christians versus heathens (religion). But they all 
eventually coalesced into the basic opposition of white versus nonwhite.”20 Here, Mills’ notion 
of the development of race aligns with Zack’s multifaceted approach to defining what race is. I 
believe such a definition of race that acknowledges that non-European cultures, societies, 
                                                 
17 Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze, Achieving Our Humanity: The Idea of the Postracial Future (Abingdon-on-Thames, 
UK: Routledge, 2001) 17. 
18 Mills’ Racial Contract is inspired by Carole Pateman’s Sexual Contract, which describes the conscious 
development of subordinating gender dynamics in the western world. In no way do I ever wish to imply that social 
contract theories, political thought, or western society in general are exclusively racialized or racist. That is to say, 
they are also exclusionary regarding gender, sexuality, ability, etc. These topics, however, are not the primary focus 
of this paper.  
19 Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999) 11.  
20 Mills, Racial Contract, 21.  
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governments, and regions have been tied to differences in skin color is an appropriate definition 
to use.  
 The writing of Sylvia Wynter, a critic and philosopher, can add further nuance to this 
definition. Wynter argues that race evolved alongside the concept of personhood, which was 
developed during the Renaissance and Enlightenment,21 as Chuckwudi Eze suggests. Yet when 
this concept of personhood developed during these eras in Europe, the concept involved the 
“descriptive/prescriptive statements of what it is to be human” to “reground its secularizing own 
on a newly projected human/subhuman distinction.”22 The creation of “person” thus demanded 
the creation of “non-person” or “sub-person.” These distinctions were justified by the 
development of race as an idea, as a method for grouping people into these categories. Wynter 
further demonstrates that these distinctions were “proven” through evolutionary theory.23 Taking 
Wynter, Mills, Chuckwudi Eze, and Zack together, it is clear that the development of race as a 
concept was due to the desire of one group, here Europeans, to solidify their position over other 
groups, here everyone else. One could say that racism existed before race. 
 Yet when we speak of race in our day-to-day lives, we often do not consider the history 
of the concept. To state that someone is a different race than I am is to mean that their skin is a 
different color than mine—although this colloquial understanding of race is certainly 
insufficient, for a pale white woman would not be considered to be a different race from a tanned 
white woman, although they have different colors of skin. For this paper, then, I believe it will be 
useful to consider both a nuanced, modern understanding of race—a socially construed method 
of grouping people based off of not only their skin color, but also nationality, culture, society, 
                                                 
21 Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its 
Overrepresentation—An Argument, CR: The New Centennial Review 3, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 263.  
22 Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being,” 264. 
23 Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being,” 273. 
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etc.—for each social contract, but also consider what race meant during the times in which each 
contract was written.  
Racism, on the other hand, might be an even more nebulous term than race. Consider the 
questions that permeate public discourse. Can anyone be racist? Are there different types or 
degrees of racism? How can we know when something is racist? Is taking offense enough to 
qualify a statement or action as racist? How prevalent is systemic racism? It is not the purpose of 
this project to answer any of these questions in great detail—or at all—but an accessible working 
definition of racism must still be established. It may be useful to distinguish between 
individualized racism and institutional, or systemic racism. 
Individualized racism may be loosely defined as individual beliefs that may manifest in 
actions regarding differences in people that are tied solely to their race—these are individual 
biases. Individualized racism is a person using a racial slur, or saying, “I’m not a racist, but—” 
and then proceeding to state a claim. The idea that former American president Barack Obama is 
secretly a Kenyan Muslim is a racist idea. (It also demonstrates how nationality and religion may 
be linked to race, as alluded to by Mills.) Believing that undocumented Mexican immigrants are 
primarily rapists and thieves is yet another example. Wanting to create an all-white ethno-state is 
also an instance of individualized racism. It should be noted that racial biases do not have to be 
openly expressed by a person for that person to have them—assuming that a person of a different 
race is a criminal is one other way racial biases may manifest themselves.  
Institutional, or systemic racism is both a result of internalized, individualized racism and 
a structure that allows individualized racism to persist. Individual racial biases may explain why 
a judge will give different sentences to white defendants and black defendants, but systemic 
institutional racism explains the structures that allow the judge to do this in the first place. 
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William Julius Wilson writes that institutional racism is a system of inequality on racial lines that 
is “reinforced and directed by entrenched social norms, norms that define and prescribe 
subordinate positions for designated racial groups.”24 Mills’ Racial Contract is a philosophical 
rendering of institutionalized racism, where society itself is structured to benefit one racial group 
over another; the members of the benefiting group will benefit, regardless of whether they 
consent to the system or are even aware of its existence. In the United States, the benefiting 
group consists of white Americans.  
Systemic racism may be evidenced in the wage and wealth gaps between white 
Americans, black Americans, and Hispanic Americans. Systemic racism is also at play when 
during discussions about the wage gap between men and women, statistics for white women’s 
wages are used, whereas the gap between men and black women, or men and Hispanic women, 
is even larger. Systemic racism needn’t be on the national level, either. It may also manifest itself 
in a more specific manner. Over three-quarters of the members of the American Philosophical 
Association are white,25 whereas only about 60% of Americans are white. Unequal 
representation in certain groups or exclusionary atmospheres are also examples of 
institutionalized, or systemic racism.  
 
Methodology  
I have now provided definitions for the crucial ideas of this piece, albeit some of these 
definitions are quite broad. The remainder of this introduction will be devoted to pinpointing 
where my project falls within the intersection between critical race studies and political 
                                                 
24 As quoted in Chuckwudi Eze, Achieving Our Humanity, 168.  
25 “Demographic Statistics on APA Membership, FY2015 to FY2017,” American Philosophical Association. 
Accessed December 27, 2018.  
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philosophy, defining the methodological approach I shall use when exploring these concepts, and 
finally providing a road map for the rest of the paper.  
 Mills and Wynter have already defined overarching, holistic narratives for a racialized 
intellectual history, springing up out of an us-versus-them structure, where “us” refers to 
European societies, societies dominated by people with European roots, and to individual white 
people, and “them” refers to everything and everyone else. My work here will affirm the 
conclusions of Mills and Wynter, but will approach the same issues with a much more itemized 
focus. While I will reference Mills and Wynter at times in this paper, our projects should be seen 
as different. Instead of tracing the history and motives of racialized western thought, I will look 
specifically at the history and repercussions of the three social contracts that are most prevalent 
in the western liberal tradition, specifically in the United States.  
Because I have narrowed my focus to western liberalism, especially within the United 
States, I will only be discussing the social contracts of Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls. While 
numerous other social contracts exist in western political thought, none are quite so influential to 
the development of western liberalism—a theory of statehood meant to promote freedom and 
equal personhood for all—as the social contracts I have identified. This is why this paper will not 
address other important political theorists such as Hobbes or Kant—analyzing their respectively 
authoritarian and universalist social contracts will illuminate few ideas about the western 
democratic, liberal tradition. 
As I trace the ideas that I am arguing for, I will primarily use the methodological 
approach developed by Quentin Skinner. This approach considers both the author’s words and 
ideas and the context in which they were created, to better understand the dialogue that existed 
between the author and their cultural milieu. Skinner writes that  
 15 
[T]o understand a text must be to understand both the intention to be understood, 
and the intention that this intention should be understood, which the text itself as 
an intended act of communication must at least have embodied...we therefore 
confront, in studying any given text, is what its author, in writing at the time he 
did write for the audience he intended to address, could in practice have been 
intending to communicate by the utterance of this given utterance.26  
 
To put it more simply, when analyzing and understanding the ideas put forth by Locke, 
Rousseau, and Rawls, we must ask the question: What is this thinker trying to add to the 
conversation that is happening around him? So, when exploring whether or not Locke’s social 
contract provides justification for slavery, it is necessary to consider what “slavery” meant in 
Britain during the late 1600s, what other writers and thinkers were saying about slavery, what 
Locke himself said about slavery in other documents, and what Locke’s motives were in writing 
the Second Treatise. This framework thus provides a comprehensive view of not only the content 
of a text, but also the author’s motivations in creating it, as well as whether it affirms or denies 
the prevailing ideas of the era in which it was written.  
Skinner’s method of understanding historical texts and ideas of course is not the only 
approach one may take. A purely textualist approach (or “perennialism,” as Skinner calls it) 
would look only at the world in which the thinker expressed their ideas. Skinner criticizes this 
approach on the grounds that it traps historians of thought in a mindset that few unique and new 
ideas are developed, as a “historian of ideas will unavoidably be set, in approaching any given 
writer, by some sense of the defining characteristics of the discipline to which the given writer 
may be said to have contributed.”27 If we believe that the defining characteristics of a discipline 
are generally the same throughout history, then we may say that the contributions to a discipline 
will also be quite similar throughout history. Reiterating the same ideas and analyzing these 
                                                 
26 Quintin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969): 48-9.  
27 Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding,” 22.  
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ideas over and over is not a very profitable endeavor, and so Skinner’s approach is preferable to 
a perennialistic method. 
 There is also the possibility that I should look solely at the texts themselves as I proceed 
through this project. But this is once again problematic. Skinner points out that when this 
happens, “We engage rather in an often intolerable wrestle with words and their meanings.”28 
Instead of truly considering what ideas mean, we must first instead establish what their parts 
mean—what words mean, but without the benefit of looking to other texts from the time period 
for guidance. This, says Skinner, results in historians, especially philosophical historians, writing 
“historical nonsense.”29 Even if one can avoid these pitfalls of this approach, Skinner sill does 
not believe that it is an advisable method to use. He writes, “The methodology remains incapable 
in principle of considering or even recognizing some of the most crucial problems which must 
arise in any attempt to understand the relations between what a given writer may have said, and 
what he may be said to have meant by saying what he said.”30 Exploring a text only by exploring 
the text leaves out critical information to actually develop a thorough understanding of what an 
author intended to do. As Skinner’s methodology does not pose this issue, it is once again 
preferable. For these reasons, I will primarily be approaching the issue of social contracts and 
race from this methodological perspective.  
 Notwithstanding, Skinner’s methodology does have its limits, as any methodological 
approach will have. For instance, ideas are often misinterpreted or misapplied. Skinner 
acknowledges this as “perlocutionary uptake.” If a philosophical concept is misunderstood or 
misapplied, this should not necessarily be blamed on the author or creator of that concept. Yet, it 
                                                 
28 Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding,” 30.  
29 Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding,” 31.  
30 Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding,” 31.  
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is also necessary to at least give a cursory glance at the impacts a work has, especially if harm 
occurred from interpreting a work in a certain way. While the probable, intended meaning of the 
author is highly important, it should be evaluated alongside some of the impacts the work had to 
fully contextualize the work as a whole. Consequently, there will be times throughout this piece 
where I depart from Skinner. I shall indicate when I do so.  
 Finally—some concerns. I am a white woman using a methodology developed by a white 
man to analyze and describe the racialized dynamics created by three philosophers. I will never 
be able to experience the subordination these dynamics create, and thus I will never fully 
understand it. Moreover, I am writing in a time and place where the power structures created and 
perpetuated by the social contractualists I discuss remain. While I have (I think I have—I hope I 
have) progressive motives, I am still benefited by this structure. I am not sure that I am the best 
mouthpiece for the arguments presented here. There is an additional problem even with the 
language I use—Wynter describes the development of language as something “to ensure that 
we continue to know our present order of social reality, and rigorously so, in the adaptive ‘truth-
for’ terms needed to conserve our present descriptive statement.”31 In other words, language has 
so developed that it makes it impossible for us to ever fully break free of existing structures that 
perpetuate racism. I am not sure how to fix this. Consequently, I expect that there will be things 
that I am incorrect about over the course of this paper. I welcome any and all criticisms of the 
arguments and ideas presented here.  
----- 
In each chapter of this thesis, I will first describe the context in which the respective 
authors were writing. I will then outline the respective social contract and explore the racial 
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implications of that contract. I will consider objections to and qualifications of my arguments, 
while examining pieces of evidence contemporary to the creations of each contract to 
demonstrate that a racialized understanding of these ideas is correct. I will finally draw parallels 
between the racial implications of each contract and modern issues relating to race.  
In the first chapter, I shall discuss Locke’s contract, paying special attention to his views 
on personhood, property and labor. I will argue that his contract supports the colonization of the 
Americas and chattel slavery. I will consider arguments regarding Locke’s belief that all people 
were created equal and that his ideas are not strong enough to be considered imperialist. I will 
refer to another one of Locke’s works, the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolinas, to further 
contextualize his writing.  
The second chapter analyzes Rousseau. I will reconstruct Rousseau’s social contract, 
highlighting his beliefs regarding personhood, rationality, and physical environment. I will 
conclude that Rousseau’s social contract is exclusionary based on rationality and national origin, 
which are implicitly linked to race. I shall take into account various objections that state that 
Rousseau could not have been racist as he advocated against slavery and colonialism, or that his 
contract actually offers liberating tendencies.  
The final chapter regards Rawls. In this chapter, I will begin by defining Rawls’ social 
contract, describing the logical implications of the original position and the two principles of 
justice he develops. I will argue that while Rawls does not approve of racism, his contract still 
allows for it on both individual and systemic levels and thus cannot be a comprehensive view of 
justice, as there is no mechanism for mitigating these issues. I will evaluate Rawls’ contract 
through the applicability that some have claimed for it, and as an ideal theory, as Rawls intended 
it to be understood.   
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Ultimately, I argue that the social contracts of Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls in differing 
ways and degrees fulfill the aforementioned definition of racist; I will proceed by exploring each 
social contract individually, and identifying cultural trends and ideas prevalent in both the 
societies in which the contracts were formed and in contemporary American society that 
illustrate the repercussions of the racialized aspects of each social contract.  
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Locke on America and Locke in America  
 In his survey of “world” knowledge, popular historian Charles Van Doren states that John 
Locke’s writings on property in the Second Treatise of Government are “powerful, and they 
make any discourse serious and weighty.”32 Apart from the meaning Van Doren finds in Locke’s 
writing itself, he also argues that without Locke, the United States would have lacked theoretical 
support for revolution against Britain.33 Van Doren extends this even further by suggesting that 
the American victory against the British “confirmed the rightness of the English-Lockean 
political doctrine.”34 Van Doren further argues that no convincing argument has been levied 
against Locke’s social contract.35 Thus, the United States is indebted to Locke for its existence, 
and Locke is indebted to the United States for proving that his infallible ideas regarding 
government are just and moral.  
It is a common idea that Locke’s philosophy, especially his social contract, helped form 
American government. Mark Griffith, a professor of political science, argues that Locke 
“profoundly affected the principles upon which the government of the United States was 
founded...Locke presents his case for what we would call modern liberal democracy. He created 
the modern emphasis on constitutionalism that defines, in part, the relationship between the 
political system and the bureaucracy.”36 Locke, like the other social contract theorists to be 
discussed, has profoundly shaped American government, political thought, and western political 
trends in general—at the very least, he is believed to be a large influence on American political 
thought and government. 
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Jeremy Waldron likewise argues that Locke’s philosophy is egalitarian, and consequently 
has influenced the egalitarian aspects of American government and law. Waldron argues that 
Lockean equality as expressed in the Second Treatise has a profound basis, as Locke argues that 
the origin of equality is God.37 This is supported by passages where Locke describes equality as 
God-given and inherent to the state of nature; he states that people are, by nature, equal, created 
that way by God.38 He also writes, “there cannot be supposed any subordination among us.”39 
Moreover, the state of nature is one of perfect equality.40 Looking at these passages in light of 
the knowledge that Locke was influential on American political thought and ideals, one may 
believe that Locke is responsible for inspiring some of the more noble values claimed by 
American government.  
 Yet this is deeply troubling, because Locke’s social contract is both exclusionary and 
subordinating based on the emerging concept of race; it excludes those who violate the laws of 
nature from rationality and personhood, thus allowing for their subordination and the 
appropriation of their resources. It is certainly not egalitarian. Scholars such as Charles Mills, 
Naomi Zack, Robert Bernasconi, and Anika Maaza Mann have contributed much to the 
scholarship surrounding Locke’s racialized philosophy. Their arguments focus primarily on 
Locke’s construct of labor and personhood, and how laboring in an unsatisfactory manner 
excludes one from personhood. I shall draw upon these arguments and extend them with an 
analysis of Locke’s entire social contract; while Locke’s conceptualization of labor is the 
foundation for his social contract, it is not its totality. I shall ultimately argue that Locke’s social 
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contract demands colonialism, as it is one of the responses implied by Locke as a solution to an 
unjust government. Additionally, I shall explore the ambiguities of Chapter Four of the Second 
Treatise, which addresses slavery. While many scholars agree that Locke supported chattel 
slavery, this conclusion is often drawn by looking at Locke’s life and his involvement in the 
slave trade. I wish to demonstrate that Locke’s writing itself can support racialized chattel 
slavery, particularly when Locke’s social contract is combined with his just war theory. 
 In this section, I will present textual context regarding Locke’s time period and 
intellectual climate. I will reconstruct Locke’s social contract and argue that it supports 
colonialism. I shall summarize Locke’s just war theory and argue that, combined with his social 
contract, his philosophy supports racialized slavery. I also seek to consider objections to this 
overall line of argumentation. Some contest that Locke supports egalitarianism, and thus he 
could not have truly supported colonialism or slavery. Others contend that Locke does not 
support imperialistic conquest. Ultimately, I wish to demonstrate that Locke’s contract creates a 
racialized world, which is a significant cause for concern for all those who are committed to 
fairness and equality in American laws and government, considering that it offers a theoretical 
underpinning for American government and political thought.  
 
Artifacts 
To understand the context in which Locke was writing, and why a man who never traveled to the 
Americas may have held the ideas he did about America, I here present two texts from his time 
period that may offer clues to the cultural milieu Locke existed in, perhaps offering explanations 
for his thought. The first is John Smith’s travel log, recounting the time he spent in the British 
colony of Jamestown. The second is pseudo-anthropological, an account of natural history from 
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Francis Bacon. Per Skinner, I will not argue that Locke was directly and meaningfully influenced 
by any of these texts, but rather I introduce them in order to establish the climate in which Locke 
was writing, and to describe some ideas that he was most likely aware of.  
In 1608, roughly eighty years before John Locke wrote his Second Treatise on 
Government, John Smith returned to Britain from the English colony at Jamestown and 
published a description of various events that had occurred at the colony. Smith paid particular 
attention to the relationship between the colony and the indigenous tribes who lived in the area, 
and much of his travel log recounts his various attempts to trade with indigenous people. In this 
account, Smith is just as likely to describe indigenous tribes as “extremely kinde” and as 
“churlish and trecherous.”41 He praises the chief of the Powhatan people for having a “grave and 
Majesticall countenance,” although Smith’s expectations were apparently low, as he quickly 
states that he was in awe “to see such state in a naked Salvage.”42 
While remaining tonally consistent, Smith fluctuates between implicitly praising and 
criticizing indigenous tribes, often comparing them to English society to determine what is 
praiseworthy or blameworthy.  He writes of Powhatan burial rights: “Their Kings they burie 
betwixt two mattes within their houses, with all his beads, jewels, hatchets, and copper: the other 
in graves like ours. They acknowledge no resurrection.”43 While Smith describes the intricacies 
of indigenous societies and towns, he implies that they are still lacking in comparison to those of 
Europe, for “in these plaines are planted aboundance of houses and people; they may containe 
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1000 Acres of most excellent fertill ground...so strong a prospect, for an invincible strong City, 
with so many commodities, that I know as yet I have not seene.”44 
The implication, of course, is that Indigenous Americans have constructed an impressive 
civilization for them, but that they have not utilized all of the rich natural resources surrounding 
them. Someone else (England) could do truly spectacular things with those resources. This idea 
is bolstered by Smith’s concluding statement, where his desire is “in after times to see our Nation 
to enjoy a Country, not onely exceeding pleasant habitation, but also very profitable for comerce 
in generall; no doubt pleasing to almightie God, honourable to our gracious Soveraigne, and 
commodious generally to the whole Kingdome.”45 Smith offers no suggestions for if or how 
English colonists and Indigenous Americans should live together, although he does state that 
conversion of different tribes to Christianity is essential. While there is no evidence to suggest to 
what extent Locke was influence by Smith’s ideas, it is very likely that he was at least aware of 
the basic contents of Smith’s writings. The descriptions Smith presents, as well as his overall 
argument regarding the utilization of resources, align with the arguments Locke presents in the 
Second Treatise regarding the richness of the Americas, as well as the insufficient use of 
resources by Indigenous Americans.  
 The second piece we shall consider here is Francis Bacon’s work on natural history, 
Sylva Sylvarum. Bacon catalogues different pieces of the natural world, from plants to animals to 
rocks, in an effort to describe the history of the world. Invariably, he discusses human history. 
He writes, “So marvel you not at the thin Population of America, nor at the Rudeness and 
Ignorance of the People; for you must account your Inhabitants of America as a young People, 
younger a thousand years at the least than the rest of the World, for that there was so much time 
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between the Universal Flood, and their particular Inundation.”46 We see that Bacon considers 
different groups of people to be at different developmental stages, with those who live in the 
Americas to be the least-developed and civilized group of people.  
Bacon continues to separate Indigenous Americans from all other people by argue that 
“being a simple and savage people (not like Noah and his Sons, which was the chief Family of 
the Earth) they were not able to leave Letters, Arts, and Civility to their Posterity.”47 With this 
statement, Bacon excludes Indigenous Americans from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Moreover, 
he strongly implies that markers of civilization—letters, arts, and civility—are not developed in 
Indigenous Americans, and cannot be developed solely by Indigenous Americans.  
Here, we see a beginning of racialized thought. While Bacon does not draw arbitrary 
distinctions between groups of people based on a few physical characteristics, he does 
distinguish an Other in three immutable ways—age as a group of people, descent, and religious 
background. Because Indigenous Americans are, allegedly, an undeveloped and relatively new 
group of people, they lack civilization and are not European. Because they are not descended 
from the survivors of the Biblical flood, they do not share a common ancestor with the rest of 
humanity. Because they lack this common ancestor, they are neither Christian nor civilized—not 
European. These are the beginnings of racialized thought, which we may consider proto-racist, 
similar to what we shall see in Locke’s writing.  
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Locke’s Social Contract 
We may now turn to Locke’s social contract itself. In particular, it is important to understand his 
concepts of labor and property, as his social contract is based on his understandings of these 
ideas.  
Labor is an action that appropriates resources from the state of nature, or otherwise 
improves resources; property is created by the appropriation of resources by use of one’s labor. 
Labor takes from the state of nature and improves the resources that were appropriated—a tree is 
labored upon when it is cut down and turned into boards, and those boards are labored upon 
when they are turned into a chair. Labor is also what creates property, specifically private 
property, as we already own our labor. Naomi Zack makes the distinction that private property 
may exist “not on the grounds that people deserve to own what they have labored to produce but 
on the grounds that they already own their labor.”48 Thus, private property is created when one 
appropriates or infuses resources with one’s labor. After I have turned the tree into boards, the 
boards are my property and are more valuable than the tree, because I have infused them with my 
labor. You may purchase the boards from me to turn them into a chair, which is then your 
property and is more valuable than the boards, because it has been infused with additional labor. 
Consequently, labor—improving resources—is necessary for private property. If there is no 
improvement or appropriation of resources, there is no private property. Likewise, if there is no 
private property, then no one must have labored, as labor is necessary for private property to 
exist, and labor always appropriates.  
We may now move on to reconstructing Locke’s social contract, the first part of which is 
based on his ideas surrounding labor and property. This reconstruction will also begin to reveal 
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the extent to which the contract is predicated on racially exclusionary notions of property, 
ownership, and personhood. As previously mentioned, private property is created by the 
appropriation of resources by use of one’s labor. Locke argues that God has given the world for 
people to use.49 God has commanded people to utilize the resources provided, and thus not 
appropriating from nature would be disobeying the will of God. He also commanded people to 
labor.50 Therefore, not laboring is also disobeying the will of God, and presumably the laws of 
nature, as God has created the natural order and the laws governing it. Following Hooke’s logic, 
this would also violate the laws of nature. If people are built to labor and they do not, they are 
not fulfilling their most basic function.   
People may—and should—be punished if they violate the laws of nature.51 Since 
exercising one’s labor and appropriating resources are, then, laws of nature as ordained by God, 
not doing so makes one liable to punishment. Locke states that those who violate the laws of 
nature renounce their status as humans, and become “wild savage beasts.”52 Additionally, the 
person who was violated because of the breakage of a law of nature “has this power of 
appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation.”53 
Therefore, if all people Locke considers to be civilized are wronged by the fact that those who 
are considered to be uncivilized are not properly exercising their labor, then the civilized may 
respond in kind to the uncivilized, who have lost some of their status as persons as they have 
violated the laws of nature.  
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The second portion of Locke’s social contract regards what a just government looks like, 
and how people interact with their governments. A just government is formed at the consent of 
the governed.54 People first form governments in order to protect their basic freedoms, especially 
their property, from other people.55 Consequently, a just government will protect those basic 
freedoms, including property. Because of this, civilization will be marked by laws protecting 
private property. As the government is just at the consent of the governed, continual consent, 
whether it be tacit or voluntary, is necessary.56 If the individual does not wish to consent to the 
government they find themselves under, they may either change that government, or establish a 
new government somewhere else. Locke writes that an individual may move to a different 
country, or “agree with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis [empty places], in any part of 
the world, they can find free and unpossessed.”57 This is a “safety valve” offers a reprieve for 
Locke’s broad reading of consenting to a government. One does not have to rebel against a 
government they consider unjust; instead, they may join or form a new state.  
In short, Locke’s social contract states that persons obey the laws of nature, one of which 
is to appropriate resources with one’s labor, thus creating private property. Government is 
formed at the consent of the governed, and is created in part to protect people’s right to their 
property. People may change their governments or move elsewhere to form new ones. These 
premises ultimately underscore a racially exclusionary contract that supports the colonization of 
the Americas, European imperialism, and race-based chattel slavery.  
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Locke and American Colonialism  
Let us now return to the first portion of the contract regarding labor and property. At multiple 
times, Locke states that the Americas have been left to nature, as he does not believe that 
Indigenous Americans appropriate from the land or make proper use of their resources. Locke 
writes that the Americas lack the “improvements” that characterize European civilization.58 This 
is specifically because the Americas, while rich in natural resources, have not been improved by 
labor: 
There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several Nations of the 
Americas are of this, who are rich in Land and poor in all the Comforts of Life; whom 
Nature having furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of Plenty, i.e. 
a fruitful Soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food, raiment, and 
delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the 
Conveniences we enjoy.59 
 
Locke further goes on to argue that it is the lack of labor and improvements that makes America 
(and its inhabitants) so uncivilized and brutish.60 The notion that non-Europeans are not properly 
making use of their labor and their resources, as God has supposedly commanded them to do, is 
a critical issue for Locke. By violating the laws of nature by not properly laboring, Indigenous 
Americans forfeit their personhood, so long as they do not appropriate with their labor. Mills 
writes that this ultimately means that “whiteness itself becomes property, nonwhites do not fully, 
or at all, own themselves, and nonwhite labor does not appropriate nature.”61 For Locke, 
Indigenous labor does not appropriate from the state of nature.  
As Locke implies in his social contract, those who violate the laws of nature—those he 
calls “wild and savage beasts,” those who are now excluded from personhood—ought to be 
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punished by those who do not, those who labor. Those who commit violations of laws of nature 
must not be punished unfairly, however, for the response must be equal to the original 
violation.62 Locke never advocates for the genocide of Indigenous Americans that eventually 
occurred, but we see that he still advocates for some sort of response to their supposed lack of 
labor and appropriation. Locke writes that the person who was violated because of the breakage 
of a law of nature “has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the 
offender, by right of self-preservation.”63 The response is that European colonists have the right 
to utilize the resources that other, seemingly uncivilized peoples aren’t using. Thus, a civilized 
(European) individual will not kill individuals who are not appropriating from nature, provided 
those people haven’t made any attempts on the individual’s life. The individual instead just 
ought to appropriate their resources and their labor, as they aren’t making satisfactory use of 
them.  
We have already established that Locke thinks that Indigenous Americans generally lack 
labor, property, and civilization. This makes the Americas the perfect location for new 
governments to be established. Regarding those who, discontent with their current governments, 
wish to establish a new one, Locke very specifically states, “Let him plant some in-land, vacant 
places of America.”64 This is justified because in Locke’s view, the Americas are basically 
empty places, teeming with unappropriated resources, all there for taking by Europeans, who will 
no doubt improve them. Mills points out that the empty spaces that Locke describes as ripe for 
settlement are, obviously, not empty, but are rather filled with “‘human beasts,’ who are an 
obstacle to development, rather than capable of development themselves, and whose 
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extermination or at least clearing away is a prerequisite for civilization.”65 In a similar vein, 
Locke continues: 
Yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not 
having joined with the rest of mankind in the consent of the use of their common money) 
lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do, or can make use of, or so still 
lie in common.66  
 
Here we see Locke’s response to the fact that there are already people living on these swaths of 
seemingly unappropriated land. Being uncivilized, they have lost some of their rights to land and 
the resources of the Americas. This conclusion ultimately justifies the colonialism of the 
Americas, as well as European imperialism in general. 
 Yet Locke also speaks of equality, stating, “In the beginning all the world was 
America.”67 How could colonizing the Americas be justified if everyone came from the same 
state of nature? Considering all that has been previously said about Locke’s views on non-
Europeans, it is evident that he does not view people as currently equal. This is easily reconciled 
with what is explicitly said about equality in the Second Treatise. All people may have started as 
equals, but this does not mean that people and societies will necessarily end up as equals. In the 
beginning, there was no difference between Europeans and Indigenous Americans, or Europeans 
and Africans, but in Locke’s view, this is clearly no longer the case. Therefore, the idea that all 
people were created equal is amended by the understanding that for Locke, all people are no 
longer equal. Even if we accept the idea that Locke wished for all people contemporary to him to 
be treated as equals, his prioritization of the rights of Europeans over non-Europeans shows that 
non-Europeans lack the full personhood that he assigns to Europeans. Indigenous Americans, 
Africans, and other non-Europeans could only justifiably be considered the equals of Europeans 
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once they themselves had been Europeanized. Consequently, Locke’s egalitarianism only applies 
to the time when all people were in the state of nature, or to contemporary Europeans and any 
non-Europeans whose “otherness” has been sufficiently erased. For Locke, in the beginning the 
whole world might have been America, but Locke has broken up his world into America and 
Europe. 
We have now established how Locke’s social contract can support colonialism. I argue 
that it must support colonialism. Locke’s social contract simply does not work if there is no 
outlet for people to escape unjust governments by setting up their own governments—otherwise, 
we would find ourselves in the logically indefensible position of people being forced by 
circumstance to tacitly consent to their possibly unjust governments. There must be some sort of 
safety valve for people to escape unjust governments.  
The safety valve proposed by Locke is colonization in the Americas—the “empty” 
places. He justification comes from the belief that people currently living in the Americas lack 
civilization and are actually in violation of natural law, as they utilize neither their labor nor their 
resources. Locke’s social contract supports the idea that the rights of a seemingly civilized, 
European individual ought to be prioritized over the rights of seemingly uncivilized, non-
European individual. A non-European’s personhood is consequently more suspect and less 
valuable than the personhood of a civilized European. Because of this, Europeans actually have 
the responsibility to establish justice, civilization, and property in the Americas—and 
presumably other “empty” areas around the world, ultimately creating an imperialist mindset. 
Thus, Locke’s social contract is irrevocably tied to racism, colonialism, and imperialism. 
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Locke and Slavery 
Yet this isn’t all Locke’s social contract can justify—it also serves to justify the race-based form 
of chattel slavery that was just emerging as Locke wrote the Second Treatise—and which he 
profited off of and helped to develop. Locke devotes a single, somewhat cryptic chapter to 
slavery—slavery is only lawful, but only in certain circumstances, which are not clarified until 
Locke’s more illuminating chapter regarding conquest. Locke later writes in the Second Treatise 
on just and unjust wars. From these sections, we may discern the following.  
Locke states that if a person forfeits their life “by some act that deserves death”—i.e. 
harming another, violating another’s property rights, violating a law of nature, etc.—then the 
person to whom the life was forfeited may “delay to take it, and make use of him to his own 
service.”68 In other words, if a violation of a law of nature is committed, the person who 
committed the violation may be punished not always by death, but by some form of servitude. 
This is permissible because a violation of a law of nature is an act of war, according to Locke, 
and those who commit such violations, putting themselves and others into a state of war, “are not 
under the ties of the common law of reason...and so may be treated as beasts of prey.”69 Here 
again, Locke mentions that those who have broken a law of nature—whether this be by violence 
or by not appropriating property—have forfeited their personhood. He states that since to violate 
the laws of nature demonstrates that the actor lacks reason, they may be treated as an animal.  
Notwithstanding, Locke also says that one may not “enslave himself to any one.”70 This 
would seem to imply that Locke does not approve of slavery. But this statement is reflexive—
one may not enslave themselves to another, but Locke does not state that one may not enslave 
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another. In fact, considering the previously mentioned statements, it seems that Locke does in 
fact believe that slavery may be permissible under certain circumstances, specifically when a law 
of nature has been violated—the violator may be enslaved instead of executed, and the fact that 
they have established themselves as lacking in rationality, and thus personhood, adds further 
justification to their status as a slave.  
Locke further expands upon these points when he describes just and unjust wars. In an 
unjust war, enslaving conquered people would not be permissible, as the war itself was unjust, 
and thus, “the aggressor...can, by such an unjust war, never come to have a right over the 
conquered.”71 Yet this is not the case for a just war, which occurs when a violation of a law of 
nature is being punished—this may occur if one group unjustly attacks another, as it would be 
just for the second group to defend itself. This may also occur if the most basic law of nature—
that one should labor—is violated. When a just war ends, the power of a lawful conqueror over 
the lawfully conquered is “perfectly despotical” with “absolute power over the lives of those, 
who by an unjust war have forfeited them.”72 Thus an extreme reaction to aggressors in a just 
war, such as slavery, would be entirely fine, according to Locke. 
 It thus seems clear that Locke believes that slavery is justified under certain 
circumstances. Does race-based, chattel slavery fall under the circumstances Locke specifies? In 
the Second Treatise, Locke does not write as explicitly on his beliefs regarding labor and 
appropriation by Africans as he does regarding labor and appropriation by Indigenous 
Americans. In the previous section, it was established that for Locke, non-white labor, especially 
Indigenous labor, does not appropriate from the state of nature. It is likely that Locke would have 
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viewed the people living on the African continent as living in a state of nature without properly 
appropriating from it. Jennifer Welchman writes:  
Sub-Saharan Africa was, by Locke's standards, a State of Nature. Its peoples lived as did 
the native peoples of North America, in extended family groups, obtaining their 
livelihoods through hunting, fishing, and gathering, or through primitive forms of 
agriculture on largely unimproved, usually unenclosed land.73  
 
Those who do not appropriate from the state of nature are violating one of the most fundamental 
laws of nature—that all persons labor. When we couple these pieces of Locke’s social contract 
with the statements made in the chapters on war, conquest, and slavery, we see that when a law 
of nature is violated, the violators have created a state of war. Thus, by not appropriating, 
individuals revoke their personhood and place themselves in a state of war. Because of this, all 
who do not appropriate could justifiably be enslaved. If non-white labor does not appropriate, all 
non-white individuals could be enslaved.  
 Consequently, race-based slavery would be permissible when we consider Locke’s social 
contract and his comments on slavery and just wars. But the chattel slavery that was developing 
at the time Locke author the Second Treatise was also hereditary—the children of an enslaved 
woman would also be enslaved. Locke seems to denounce hereditary slavery. He writes that 
those who justly conquer and justly enslave have no right over the property of the conquered, or 
“the innocent wife and children.”74 Thus, the children of enslaved individuals are cannot be 
enslaved just because their parent is. This is contradictory to the hereditary enslavement of 
Africans and their decedents.  
We may consider this to be true—that Locke’s social contract can justify race-based 
slavery that isn’t hereditary—or that hereditary slavery is still an option under Locke’s social 
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contract. Robert Bernasconi and Anika Maaza Mann believe that Locke’s statements on 
hereditary slavery ultimately cannot be reconciled with the form of slavery that did develop, and 
which Locke profited from and helped create; instead, there is simply a gap between his writing 
and his life.75  
I am not certain that such a contradiction exists, or that Locke’s comments on hereditary 
slavery ultimately apply to race-based chattel slavery, in light of his views on labor and 
appropriation. If non-white, here African, labor does not appropriate or improve upon resources 
already taken from the state of nature, then slavery is permissible, and Europeans will make use 
of the labor they do not believe Africans are properly using. Children born into slavery will not 
automatically be enslaved, but if Mills’ idea that non-white labor never appropriates is correct, 
then the children of slaves will not appropriate either. They cannot appropriate, not because they 
are born into slavery, but because they are not white. Consequently, Locke’s statements 
regarding hereditary slavery do not even seem to apply to the enslavement of non-white, non-
appropriating individuals. 
Some may think that this argument does not prove that Locke intended to provide a 
defense of hereditary slavery. This may be the case—as mentioned in the introduction, it is 
difficult to know an author’s full intention. Yet it should be noted that this argument was still 
used throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to justify the form of race-based, 
chattel slavery that developed.76 We can also be certain that Locke did in fact profit off of chattel 
slavery and helped shaped the emerging institution of race-based slavery to take the form that it 
did. Locke benefited from the slave trade, as one of the early investors in the first slave trading 
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companies.77 Locke was one of the first investors in the Royal Africa Company, which provided 
slaves for British colonies; he was also one of the first investors in the Merchant Adventurers, a 
company dedicated to trading slaves with the Bahamas, and which was partially sponsored by his 
patron, the Earl of Shaftesbury.78  
Not only did Lock invest in and profit off of the slave trade, he also helped shape the 
institution of chattel slavery. In his “Instructions to Governor Nicolson of Virginia” Locke stated 
that Governor Nicolson should “regard negro slaves as justifiably enslaved because they were 
captives taken in a just war.”79 While the argument from just war does not necessarily provide 
adequate justification for hereditary slavery, it was evidently enough for Locke. Moreover, 
Locke most likely played a critical role in encoding slavery in The Fundamental Constitutions of 
Carolina. There is a good amount of evidence—handwriting, word choice, previously written 
documents in a similar vein—that Locke helped write or revise some parts of the document, 
especially those parts regarding slavery.80 The Constitutions state, “Every freeman of Carolina 
shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves, of what opinion or religion 
soever.”81 This total power—entirely in line with the “perfectly despotic” relationship Locke 
describes as existing between the lawful conqueror and the lawfully conquered—was not 
necessarily precedented. Bernasconi and Maaza Mann write: 
Because Locke was writing at a time when the form of slavery to be adopted by the new 
colonies had not yet been settled, his proposals in The Fundamental Constitutions of 
Carolina and elsewhere must be understood, not as a reflection of established norms 
about how slaves should be treated, but as playing a role in establishing those norms.82  
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Consequently, Locke likely helped shape the institution of modern, race-based, chattel slavery. 
When considering whether or not Locke’s social contract and other ideas presented in the Second 
Treatise may justify slavery, it is useful to look at whether or not they were utilized to justify 
slavery at the time of their writing. If Locke considered his own ideas when investing in and 
profiting off of slave companies or when he helped write the Fundamental Constitutions, then it 
seems apparent that the Second Treatise does provide justification for race-based, chattel slavery, 
or at least Locke thought it did. Regardless, the fact that Locke argued that those who do not 
appropriate with their labor are breaking the most basic law of nature, and are thus putting 
themselves in a state of war where they may be appropriately punished, perhaps by enslavement, 
demonstrates that at the very least, a form of slavery that is necessarily racialized is supported by 
his social contract and ideas surrounding war.  
 Therefore, Locke’s social contract cannot be claimed to be truly egalitarian. Instead, 
Locke’s social contract ultimately supports and encourages colonialism and justifies some form 
of race-based slavery, perhaps to the extent of chattel slavery. The social contract is able to do 
this because it effectively strips non-white individuals from their personhood, as they do not 
labor to appropriate from the state of nature or to improve resources, thus demonstrating a lack 
of rationality and a disobedience of the laws of nature. Non-European individuals may then be 
deprived of the land they live on, the resources surrounding them, and their own labor—it is, in 
fact, the duty of civilized (white, European) individuals to do this, as violations of the laws of 
nature must be punished. For these reasons, Locke’s social contract is racist.  
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Objection: Rationality, hierarchization, and conquest  
I will now consider objections to the overall structure I have presented and summarized. This 
section has, so far, acted as refutation to the idea that Locke’s philosophy, specifically his social 
contract, can or should be understood as egalitarian. I will now also consider the objection that 
Locke does not support arranging groups of people into hierarchies, and consequently does not 
support empires. This objection is primarily articulated in historian David Armitage’s article 
“John Locke: Theorist of Empire?,” although I shall also examine related passages in Locke’s 
writings to add context to Armitage’s arguments.  
Armitage argues that Locke is not an imperialist thinker—Armitage does not address the 
point of slavery, but rather focuses on colonialism, imperialism, and empire. Armitage argues 
that 
[Locke] did not espouse or elaborate a hierarchical ordering of populations, least of all 
one that places Europeans above or even apart from other groups, because he saw 
rationality itself as evenly distributed among human populations and the usual markings 
of civilization as contingent and fragile.83  
 
The distinction that Armitage draws between colonialism and imperialism is whether or not 
groups of people are ranked, seemingly by rationality. Armitage states that Locke only once 
refers to Indigenous Americans as irrational, in the First Treatise, where Locke writes “the 
irrational untaught Inhabitants keep right by following Nature, are fitter to give us Rules, than 
Cities and Palaces, where those that call themselves Civil and Rational, go out of their way, by 
the Authority of Example.”84 Armitage argues that this passage demonstrates that Locke did not 
think that Indigenous Americans lacked rationality, or had any less than Europeans.  
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Armitage contends that the impact of this passage is that Locke would not support 
conquest, and thus cannot be imperialistic. To add context from the Second Treatise, we will 
briefly examine what Locke actually does say about conquest, just war, and unjust war. By 
abandoning civilization for war, the initiator of a war is committing an unjust act. Locke argues 
that “the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with another, and unjustly invades 
another man’s right, can, by such an unjust war, never come to have a right over the 
conquered.”85 Locke does not specifically define what unjust and just wars are; notwithstanding, 
invading another civilized land would be unjust as the aggressor would be upsetting the 
contractual, just government of that land. Thus, Locke would probably view wars and conquest 
among most European countries as unjust.  
Can these arguments about conquest be extended to the non-European world? Armitage 
believes they can be, as Locke allegedly viewed all people as equally rational, or at least equally 
capable of rationality, and thus did not create hierarchies. I have two responses to this: Locke 
does establish hierarchies, and Armitage’s version of textualism misconstrues the overall 
implications of Locke’s texts.  
 First, Locke does establish hierarchies. The arguments I have already presented so far 
support this point, but even considering the passage Armitage highlights in the First Treatise, 
hierarchies based on perceived rationality are still established. The passage cited by Armitage is: 
“the irrational untaught Inhabitants keep right by following Nature, are fitter to give us Rules, 
than Cities and Palaces, where those that call themselves Civil and Rational, go out of their way, 
by the Authority of Example.”86 The purpose of this statement appears to be to criticize 
European leaders for violating the laws of nature. In this passage, Locke directly states that 
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people living in the Americas are irrational. He does argue that they more closely follow the laws 
of nature than do many rulers in Europe, but this is not done to credit Indigenous Americans, but 
rather to criticize European rulers. Consequently, this passage does not demonstrate a globally 
egalitarian outlook or lack of a hierarchical structure, but rather, that governments in Europe are 
unjust.  
As previously mentioned, Locke writes that God gave the world to “the industrious and 
rational.”87 But in Locke’s view, the people who are truly executing their industry and rationality 
are those who live in Europe—by not improving upon their God-given resources with their labor, 
non-Europeans are demonstrating that they are not using their industry and rationality. Armitage 
argues that Locke sees Indigenous Americans’ “contingent circumstances, their education, and 
their needs as shaped by their environment”88 as the true source of inequalities between 
Europeans and Indigenous Americans, but once again, this outlook necessitates a 
Europeanization of non-Europeans in order to achieve true equality of personhood. Because 
Locke identifies differences in capacity regarding rationality and appropriation—regardless of 
cause—Locke’s views are therefore still racialized, colonialist, and imperialist. 
The impact of this hierarchy is that conquest of the Americas by the “industrious and 
rational” is just. Protecting against a violation of one of the laws of nature would be a just war, as 
Locke explicitly states that such an action places the violator into a state of war, and proper 
response is necessary on behalf of those wronged. As previously stated, conquerors in a just war 
do have power over the lives of those who fought against them in that war. This power is 
“perfectly despotical.”89 but does not extend to the property of the conquered, for this, according 
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to Locke, is reserved for the children of the conquered people, as they did not participate in the 
war.90 Since Indigenous Americans, Africans, and other non-Europeans are not in a state of 
civilization, conquering them would not be definitively unjust. Regarding appropriation of 
resources as it relates to conquest, it must be remembered that Locke sees very little property in 
America, per his definition of property. There could still be plenty of appropriation of resources 
in the Americas without violating Locke’s ideas on just conquest. Therefore, Armitage is 
incorrect that Locke does not support hierarchies based on rationality, and thus does not favor 
conquest. In fact, Locke’s writings demonstrate that exactly the opposite is true, and thus, his 
arguments on conquest are still consistent with colonialism, imperialism, and slavery. 
Second, even if one were to believe that in this passage, Locke doesn’t establish or value 
hierarchies based on rationality, to privilege this one passage over the rest of Locke’s writings 
that do establish hierarchies based on rationality and labor would be inappropriate. One reference 
should not be preferred to the implications of the rest of Locke’s writings, which have been 
outlined in the previous sections of this chapter. To do so is to minimize the rest of Locke’s 
arguments on and statements regarding Indigenous Americans, which in turn minimizes the 
harmful impacts of these arguments. Ultimately, pursing this line of argumentation misconstrues 
not only the specific passage Armitage cites, but also the overall implications of Locke’s texts. 
Ultimately, it remains hierarchical, exclusionary, and racialized.  
--- 
This demonstrates exactly how problematic any sort of reliance on Locke’s social 
contract is. Fully accepting his social contract is to accept the racism that comes along with it; we 
could take the ideas of it that are, perhaps, more palatable, such as “a just government is one that 
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is formed at the consent of the governed.” This, however, is not fully possible, as removing the 
outlet of colonialism means that people who are not actively rebelling against their governments 
are tacitly consenting to all aspects of it. Likewise, the fact that violations of the laws of nature 
must be responded to, and that significant violations should be responded to with either death or 
slavery is also problematic, for if we remove the option of slavery, we are left with death—
people may not be enslaved but could lose their lives instead, thus finally removing any barrier 
to accessing their seemingly non-appropriated land. If we continue to remove the morally and 
logically indefensible pieces of Locke’s theory, whatever results will no longer resemble Locke’s 
original ideas. It may be possible to be inspired by Locke’s social contract, but to attribute a 
stripped-down, truly egalitarian social contract to Locke is wrong, for these are no longer his 
ideas, for his ideas are dependent upon racism. It is likewise inappropriate to state that Locke’s 
social contract is truly egalitarian. Yet this does not mean that Lockean egalitarianism hasn’t 
inspired American egalitarianism—neither fosters equality for all, but rather Locke’s social 
contract and American government have both consistently supported equality for some. In other 
words, it is not incorrect to state that Locke inspired American political thought and government, 
but this must be qualified with the understanding that this inspiration has had negative impacts. It 
is not that we should be surprised that a 17th century Englishman was racist, but we should be 
troubled that the United States still attributes a positive theoretical basis for its existence to his 
ideas. There needs to be some sort of new foundational idea for what we consider to be a just 
government. Locke’s cannot suffice.  
By examining what the Second Treatise explicitly says about non-European peoples, as 
well as what Locke’s justification of property, his social contract, and his ideas on war implicitly 
imply about them, his ideas have been shown to be inherently racist. Taking into consideration 
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the social contract’s dependency on Europeans being able to move to the Americas and their 
right to appropriate the property and resources there, Locke’s social contract is also innately 
colonialist and imperialist. When we also evaluate his social contract’s insistence on labor as a 
standard for fulfilling a law of nature and achieving full personhood, as well as his theories 
regarding what entails and just war and what may be the results of a just war, we see that his 
ideas—and actions—also support race-based, chattel slavery. The continued use of his social 
contract to justify most modern western democracies is thus highly problematic. Locke’s social 
contract ultimately supports and perpetuates a racialized world view; to continue to use it as a 
model for just governments isn’t just at all. 
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Climatized Race and Rousseau 
 
We have now established that Locke’s social contract may be used to uphold chattel 
slavery and colonialism, and that Locke himself was not opposed to such things. We will now 
turn to the social contract of Jean Jaques Rousseau. It is important to note that Rousseau, in 
many places in his writing, states or argues implicitly that he adamantly opposes slavery, 
colonialism, and imperialism. It would be incorrect to assume that the social contracts of 
Rousseau and Locke have equivalent, or even similar racial implications—even if Rousseau’s 
words, out of context, could be used to justify colonialism or slavery, this would not be in 
keeping with his intentions, as he opposed and criticized both of these institutions.  
 Notwithstanding, Rousseau’s social contract has its own racial implications, primarily for 
rationality, personhood, and ultimately assimilation. The literature that discusses Rousseau’s 
handling of race often focuses on his rhetoric—his repeated use of the word “savage,” for 
instance—but not on his social contract itself. Mills’ Racial Contract is one instance of this, 
simply stating that the use of such language demonstrates that Rousseau othered non-Europeans 
and considered them not fully persons. Other pieces of literature examine Rousseau’s ideas on 
personhood and rationality—Bernard Boxhill, whose arguments I shall be addressing later in this 
chapter—offers an overview on how an individual’s perfectibility of rationality impacts the 
racial implications of Rousseau’s arguments. Yet, neither of these contemporary authors link 
their observations on Rousseau’s concepts of personhood and rationality to the social contract 
itself.  
 For these reasons, I believe it is useful to examine the racial implications of Rousseau’s 
social contract specifically. The argumentation and goals of this chapter will thus differ 
significantly from those of Mills and Wynter. They will, however, ultimately affirm the 
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conclusions of the works of Mills and Wynter—that western thought has helped created, encode, 
and perpetuate a world view that is at least racialized, if not racist.  
 In this section, I will argue that Rousseau’s climatized worldview establishes Europe and 
Europeans as the epicenter of rationality, thus denying full personhood to those who are not 
Europeans or decedents of Europeans. I will evaluate the extent to which assimilation is possible 
or desirable for non-Europeans under Rousseau’s framework, as well as the implications of 
various solutions to this problem. Some subsidiary issues, such as Rousseau’s anti-colonialism 
and the climatization versus racialization of his worldview will also be considered.   
 
Artifacts 
Again, we begin this section with a brief overview of the literature of Rousseau’s day that 
purported to describe the practices, customs, and lives of Indigenous Americans and other non-
Europeans. We will consider two texts from French explorers and missionaries who lived in the 
early French colonies in North America. 
Joseph François Lafitau, a French Jesuit missionary and early anthropologist, published 
Mores of Savage Americans in 1724. This work focuses on religious differences among various 
groups of people around the world, as well as their capacities for being converted to Catholicism, 
and thus achieving rationality. As people from Persia (Iran), India, China, Japan, and Peru all 
already had a religion identified by Lafitau, they are considered capable of aspiring to “the 
profusion of an austere, penitent life, passing down to children abstinence, chastity, poverty, 
mortification, and finally, the practice of virtues.”91 In other words, because certain people have 
an identifiable religion, they are capable of understanding Lafitau’s religion, and thus may be 
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converted. This list of people who may be converted is not exclusive, as Lafitau also describes a 
religious coming-of-age ceremony that took place in Florida.92 Consequently, some Indigenous 
Americans have the capacity for conversion, and thus rationality.  
 Yet Lafitau also seems to argue that some non-Europeans, specifically those living in the 
Americas, lack any hope of conversion or rationality. He states, “But when speaking of the 
Barbarians, to whom one is warned there is no religion, and where in effect, there is little 
apparent religion, it is to me much more difficult to watch this conformity in their customs and in 
their uses.”93 Per Lafitau’s writings, it is ambiguous whether or not he thinks that Indigenous 
Americans, on the whole, have the capacity for rationality, or whether they could eventually 
achieve it. Likewise, Rousseau’s writings will also be shown to deCmonstrate considerable 
ambiguity on this point, although I will ultimately argue that Rousseau does not think that many 
non-Europeans have full rationality.  
 The next work expands Lafitau’s scope, looking both at people who live outside of the 
Americas, and at different methods of categorization outside of religion. Jesuit missionary 
Pierre-François-Xavier de Charlevoix has been considered the first historian of the French 
colonies in the Americas. In 1744, eleven years before Rousseau wrote the Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality, Charlevoix published History and General Description of New France. 
This work primarily contains detailed descriptions of numerous Indigenous tribes living 
primarily in what is now Quebec. Charlevoix begins his piece by defining the “New World”—it 
is not just the Americans, but rather “all countries unknown to Europeans before the fourteenth 
century.”94 He then briefly describes people living in various parts of this New World. Those 
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living on the Cape of Good Hope are “mild, sociable, and well made.”95 The Aztecs are civilized 
in Charlevoix’s eyes insofar as they have mines,96 but not to the extent that they have abandoned 
human sacrifice.97 
 Charlevoix sees the primary motivation of French colonialism as spiritual. He states, “the 
founders of [French] colonies, had it, for the most part, far more at heart to plant the Faith among 
the savages, than to acquire wealth.”98  This is necessary, as the Indigenous tribes have not heard 
of Charlevoix’s Catholic faith, but have “instead lain buried in the thickest darkness of 
infidelity.”99 Consequently, colonialism, or at least established missions, is necessary to save the 
souls of the Indigenous people.  
  The other important aspect of Charlevoix’s work is that it alludes to a developing concept 
of race, specifically a concept that is linked to climate and physical environment. Charlevoix 
writes, “There are many blacks among these islanders [of the Caroline Islands], who are 
supposed to come from New Guinea, mestizos, and whites.”100 Here, a concept of race is 
developed, based on skin color and parentage. This is later linked to physical environment. Some 
areas of the world are made up of “only frightful districts, impracticable for any but wandering 
savages.”101 Consequently, the land shapes people, and certain environments are suitable for only 
certain types of people. Both land and people have varying degrees of acceptability. Finally, 
Charlevoix writes that “it must be avowed that it would be a strange thing to find black men so 
near the Pole, and in a climate where the very bears are white.”102 Here, climate influences skin 
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color—northern regions should support light skin colors, according to Charlevoix, while those 
closer to the Equator should apparently foster dark skin colors.  
 Charlevoix’s writing is important to understanding Rousseau’s cultural climate because it 
describes commonly held ideas about Indigenous Americans that Rousseau would likely have 
been aware of. Moreover, Charlevoix has begun to classify people not just based on their religion 
or perceived degree of civilization, but also based on where they live and what they look like. 
Finally, Charlevoix links these last two categorizations together, tying this emerging concept of 
race to climate and physical environment. As we shall see, Rousseau does much the same.  
 
Social Contract and Implications  
We must first reconstruct Rousseau’s contract. Previously, I implied that Rousseau writes of two 
social contracts. In Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau outlined his belief that a 
contract took people from the state of nature and into civil society. In The Social Contract, 
Rousseau describes a contract that establishes just government. I believe that treating both of 
these events as separate, yet related social contracts is not only the most comprehensive way of 
reading Rousseau, but also the most charitable. This section will describe Rousseau’s state of 
nature, both social contracts, and the implications of the second social contract.  
 
State of nature 
As with Locke, we will begin in the state of nature. Rousseau’s state of nature is a marvelous 
place where people exist in a state of freedom and equality—this is opposed to the inequality and 
lack of freedom that Rousseau identifies in society.103 People in the state of nature are stronger, 
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healthier, and seemingly happier than those in society. Indeed, Rousseau believes that the 
majority of bad influences in the world—corruption, greed, selfishness—stem from society, and 
did not exist to great extent in the pre-civilized state of nature. 
 People in the state of nature have the capacity to reason, just as people in civil society do. 
It is this capacity for rationality that separates humans from other animals.104 People, by nature, 
are self-interested, but they also possess the capacity for pity.105 It is the capacity for pity that 
prevents the state of nature from devolving into violence. Moreover, people possess the capacity 
for perfectibility.106  
 Yet it does not appear that the state of nature can create total human perfectibility. 
Rousseau writes, “All the progress of the human species continually moves away from its 
primitive state.”107 This does not necessarily mean that all progress is good, however, for “some 
[people] improve or declined and acquired various good or bad qualities which were not inherent 
in their nature.”108 Moreover, while people in the state of nature possess the capacity for 
perfectibility, the fulfillment of this is not possible without “the chance coming together of 
several unconnected causes.”109 Thus, there is some sort of push away from the state of nature, to 
a future that could be both beneficial and harmful. 
 One aspect of humanity that seems to be imperfectable in the state of nature is rationality. 
Rousseau argues that some levels of advanced thought are not obtainable in the state of nature.110 
Instead, people in the state of nature, while possessing the capacity for rationality, cannot 
achieve this, and thus make their decisions with similar motivations as animals: 
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Savage man, left by nature to instinct alone, or rather compensated for the instinct he is 
perhaps lacking by faculties capable of first replacing them and then of raising him to the 
level of instinct, will therefore begin with purely animal functions. Perceiving and feeling 
will be his first state, which he will have in common with all animals. Willing and not 
willing, desiring, and fearing will be the first and nearly the only operations of his soul  
until new circumstances bring about new developments in it.111  
In addition to lacking full rationality, Rousseau also states that people living in the state of nature 
cannot access abstract concepts such as beauty, love,112 or morality—“savages are not evil 
precisely because they do not know what it is to be good.”113 Consequently, while people in the 
state of nature are separate from non-human animals by virtue of their potential, their actual state 
places them in a similar camp as non-human creatures.  
 To support his views, Rousseau cites incidents regarding non-European individuals. He 
specifically states that Caribbean islanders are those that live closest to the state of nature.114 
Rousseau says an individual living in the Caribbean islands, and presumably others living 
relatively close to the state of nature, lacks philosophy and foresight; Rousseau states that “In the 
morning he sells his bed of cotton and in the evening he returns in tears to buy it back, for want 
to having foreseen that he would need it that night.”115 Arguably, then, the closer one is to the 
state of nature, the less rationality one has. People contemporary to Rousseau whom he felt to be 
living close to the state of nature would thus have less rationality that him. Notwithstanding, 
Rousseau is careful to note that lack of rationality is not grounds for violence or domination—
one should not harm another human because that person is sentient, not because they are 
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rational.116 Unlike Locke, Rousseau does not think that not using one’s full rational capacity is a 
violation of the laws of nature. Instead, it is part of the state of nature itself.  
 
First social contract  
It thus seems that leaving the state of nature would be a desirable thing—but Rousseau disagrees. 
Rousseau argues that as more people populate the state of nature, language will eventually 
develop; this, in turn, will cause communities to be formed.117 Communities caused people’s 
minds to become more enlightened, and for industry and technology to develop and progress.118 
Eventually, someone will establish private property, thus formally marking the exit from the 
state of nature.119 All inequalities, apart from those of a physical nature, stem from the creation 
of private property.120 Rousseau writes that “As soon as one man realized that it was useful for a 
single individual to have provisions for two, equality disappeared.”121 For Rousseau, then, 
private property a greed go hand-in-hand. One necessitates the other. 
 The creation of private property, leaving the state of nature, and entering civil society 
thus form the first social contract, described in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and 
described in a distinctly negative light. This first social contract does not just foster greed and 
corruption, however. The establishment of civil society also causes people to become slavish, 
“weak, fearful, and servile.”122 This is because Rousseau believes that society causes people to 
become soft and lazy, but also because the inequalities that develop from society eventually 
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cause oppression and the perpetuation of an unfair system. Rousseau states that people who are 
treated unfairly because of societal inequalities still approve of this system, for  
“they consent to wear chains in order to be able to give them in turn to others.”123 Thus, 
inequalities that develop will remain unaddressed, even by those who are most impacted by 
them. 
 
Second social contract 
It is because this first social contract, this perverse social contract, occurred that a second, 
necessary social contract must be established. This social contract creates a just government. 
While the state of nature is preferable to any form of civil society, it cannot be reentered, and so 
the second social contract makes the best of a bad situation. 
 Rousseau argues that “one is only obligated to obey legitimate powers.”124 What, then, is 
this legitimate power? It takes the form of a government designed to preserve any freedoms that 
remain after people have left the state of nature. People do not have the resources to protect 
themselves, and unity is the only way of protecting existing resources and ensuring self-
preservation. This need for self-preservation, however, must be reconciled with cooperation and 
the surrendering of resources.125 A just government will provide the necessary balance for these 
seemingly competing interests. 
 This is achieved through the sovereign and its expression of the general will. The general 
will is a position the citizens of the state arrive at together. The body of citizens, or the 
sovereign, is able to decipher the general will through public discussion and debate; the 
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government then enacts what the general will is. According to Rousseau, individuals can have 
opinions and desires that run contrary to the general will, but every citizen will eventually arrive 
at the same general will.126 Moreover, “whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be 
constrained to do so by the entire body; which means only that he will be forced to be free.”127 
Rousseau is thus confident that the general will shall ultimately express beneficial views, and 
that a just government will fully maximize this will of the citizens. 
  There are additional benefits to the second social contract besides the establishment of a 
just government. Rousseau believes that a just government will come as close as possible to 
enshrining the freedoms individuals had in the state of nature. Moreover, a just government, 
created by the second, necessary social contract, upholds equality; Rousseau states that all 
citizens will be treated equally by a just government.128 Finally, the second social contract will 
foster rationality. Rousseau writes that the civil state “changed [the individual] from a stupid, 
limited animal into an intelligent being and a man.”129 Civilization is thus necessary to achieving 
full rationality, and thus essential to perfectibility.  
Civilization is problematic to Rousseau for an endless amount of reasons. Yet, it does 
give one distinct benefit, even if a given society has not created a second social contract—it 
confirms the rationality of the people who create and sustain it. Without civilization, there is no 
proof of rationality. Likewise, Rousseau believes that lack of civilization is proof of lack of 
rationality—this is why those in the state of nature are both uncivilized and not fully rational. 
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Geneva 
Rousseau believed that different societies should have different types of government, as different 
population sizes, different geographical boundaries, and different climates required different 
ways of governing. The next section will examine the idea of climate more closely, but first, we 
must briefly describe Rousseau’s vision of the most ideal government—Geneva, Rousseau’s 
birthplace. 
Rousseau’s Geneva is a government where the general will is expressed by the sovereign 
and upheld by the government—considering this, it is not surprising that Rousseau dedicated the  
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality to the state. The government of Geneva, at the time of 
Rousseau’s writing, was a representative democracy, albeit representative of those granted the 
status of citizen, and not all people living in Geneva. Rousseau praises the citizens of Geneva, 
stating, “You have no other masters but the wise laws you have made, administered by upright 
magistrates of your own choosing.”130 It is Geneva that represents the ideal form of government 
for Rousseau, and thus it is apt to hold Geneva up as the sort of government that would be 
created by the second social contract. 
Geneva’s inhabitants, at the time of Rousseau’s writing, were broken down into five 
classes representing their political and legal status. Rousseau cites French mathematician and 
thinker Jean le Rond d’Alembert’s description of these classes, and then further explains each of 
them.131 Citizens. For Rousseau, are those who make up the sovereign and express the general 
will. Citizens in Geneva were the sons of the bourgeois, and were born in the city. Citizens could 
be magistrates, and were thus in charge of interpreting and executing the general will. The 
second class of inhabitant was the bourgeois. One could be a bourgeois living in Geneva in two 
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ways. One could be the son of a bourgeois or citizen, but be born outside of Geneva. One could 
also be a foreigner who was granted the status of bourgeois by the government. Regardless, the 
bourgeois could be members of the Grand Council, a legislative body. Members of the bourgeois 
could not be magistrates, however. The third class of inhabitant was made up of residents. 
Residents were foreigners who resided in Geneva by special permission, but they lacked 
governing rights and political power. Natives, the fourth class, were the sons of residents. They 
had additional privileges that residents did not have, but natives still lacked governing rights. 
Finally, foreigners were the fifth class. This class consisted of anyone who was not a citizen, 
bourgeois, resident, or foreigner.  
 
Rousseau’s Climatization  
Before moving on to address the racial implications of Rousseau’s social contract(s), we must 
look at another aspect of his philosophy—climatology. In this context, climatology refers to the 
impact climate and location in general have on the people who live in a particular area. Physical 
location and climate, for Rousseau, are critical in determining what type of government is best 
suited to a particular group of people.  
As previously stated, a country’s type of government should be partially determined by 
physical size and population.132 Yet Rousseau also states that “The same laws cannot be suited to 
such a variety of provinces, which have different morals, live in contrasting climates, and cannot 
tolerate the same form of government.”133 Climate impacts the people who live in a particular 
region, shaping their values, their morality, and their temperaments. Consequently, people who 
live in states that have similar geographical sizes and similar populations, but are in very 
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different parts of the world, should have different types of governments because the people 
themselves will be quite different. Even if these forms of government are different, they will 
both be just if they are both best suited to their respective states. 
For Rousseau, the impact that climate, environment, and location have on people is 
immense. He writes that “one people is capable of discipline at birth, another is not after ten 
centuries.”134 While everyone begins as equals in the state of nature, differing locations shape 
different groups in different ways. Thus, it is not people who choose which form of government 
best suits them, or what their society may look like, but the location itself implicitly chooses. 
Rousseau states that “in general the peoples of the north are more industrious than those of the 
south...as if nature thereby wanted to equalize things by giving to their minds the fertility it 
refuses their soil.”135 Climate impacts rationality, and has caused people living in northern 
(European) countries to best develop their cognitive ability. He further cautions against 
Europeans moving to “hot countries,” arguing that “Europeans who want to live there in the 
same style as they do at home all die of dysentery and indigestions.”136 Consequently, it seems 
that the influence of climate cannot be erased by simply moving to a new location.  
Rousseau lists several specific examples of different types of just governments, 
appropriate for different locations. He considers aristocracy to be the best form of government 
for “the savages of North America,” and states that many Indigenous tribes are satisfactorily 
governing themselves this way.137 While it may seem odd that Rousseau lauded the relative 
freedom that Genevans had while simultaneously supporting aristocratic governments for other 
groups, this is not a contradiction. Rousseau writes, “Freedom, not being a fruit of every Climate, 
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is not accessible to all peoples.”138 Some groups of people require fewer freedoms because their 
location has shaped them in this manner. Of course, Rousseau does not believe that this is not the 
case for the citizens of Geneva, “where the citizens, long accustomed to a wise independence, 
were not only free but worth of being so.”139  
Rousseau then delineates which type of government is best suited for a given climate. He 
considers productivity and land quality good measures of different forms of climate, and thus 
makes his governmental distinctions according to the perceived fertility of the land. He states: 
Unproductive and barren places, where the product is worth less than the labor to 
produce it, should remain uncultivated and deserted, or populated only by 
Savages. Places where the labor of men produces only the bare necessities should 
be inhabited by barbarous peoples; any polity would be impossible there. Places 
where the surplus of products over labor is moderate are suited to free peoples. 
Those where abundant and fertile soil produces a great deal with little labor  
demand monarchic government.140  
Here, we see not only a breakdown of Rousseau’s notions of land quality and government type, 
but also a breakdown of his views on people. Savages do not produce valuable products, and thus 
should live in areas where it is very difficult to produce anything of value. They do not produce 
anything of value because their climate has shaped them so, and thus they must continue to live 
in such a climate. Barbarians can (scarcely) provide for themselves, and therefore should live in 
areas where the soil is just fertile enough to produce the bare minimum. Expressing the general 
will is deemed impossible. Free peoples, such as the Genevans, should live in areas where one 
must work for products, but labor is not excruciating. Areas where production is high should be 
monarchies.  
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 It is consequently clear that Rousseau’s worldview is impacted by the notion that climate 
impacts the temperament, rationality, and values of both individuals and societies. The influence 
of physical location is not something that can easily be undone, however, if at all. Coupled with 
Rousseau’s social contract(s), we begin to see how his philosophy could pose significant 
questions regarding rationality, personhood, and assimilation.  
  
Impacts on Assimilation 
Rousseau does not advocate for a multicultural, ethnically diverse society. Doing so was not, of 
course, the focus of his writing. Yet his ideas ultimately uphold a worldview where 
civilization—Europeanization—is a prerequisite for achieving full rationality, and where the 
prospects for a non-European individual achieving full rationality through assimilation are slim, 
if not near-impossible. To provide some clarification, assimilation is the process by which a 
group of people adapts to and eventually practices the values, customs, and mores of a given 
society; integration occurs when the group undergoes the same process, but not to the extent that 
they lose any unique practices of their own. In the United States, we often distinguish between 
American culture and society being a melting pot (assimilated) or a mixed salad (integrated)—
this is another way to conceptualize the difference between these concepts.  
 As previously stated, Rousseau argues that people are not able to achieve full rationality 
unless they leave the state of nature and enter into civil society. The more advanced a society is, 
and the more apparent signs of civilization that it shows, the more rationality the people in it 
must have obtained. Civilization is evidence of rationality. Thus, if one group of people is closer 
to existing in the state of nature than another group, the first group must be made up of less 
rational individuals.  
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 Yet in some instances, people have left the state of nature and formed civil society. In 
others, people have not. If everyone began as equals in the state of nature, what accounts for this 
difference? Rousseau believes that this gap is caused by climate and physical location of a 
society. Those in temperate, or European, climates will ultimately desire to form just 
governments. As people living in these climates are most suited for freedoms, their governments 
will account for this, and be Geneva-esque. People living in hot climates, however, may not form 
governments, may not form just governments, or may form a just government that does not allow 
the amount of agency that a just government in a temperate state would allow. Regardless, 
climate impacts the cognitive abilities of individuals and societies, consequently impacting the 
type of government that is formed, if one is formed, and if the given group truly leaves the state 
of nature. 
 What, then, are the options for a person living in a society that Rousseau claims is close 
to the state of nature? The individual may stay in their society—Rousseau believes this is 
preferable, as differing societies will corrupt one another and people are not suited to live in 
circumstances and societies that appear to be radically different from where they have previously 
lived. Yet this leaves the individual in a state where they lack full rationality. People in civilized 
states must be fully rational, for civilization is necessary for rationality. The individual could go 
a European state, perhaps Geneva, in pursuit of rationality. Here we see two options: the 
individual must become Europeanized or the individual is unable to assimilate. 
 Why these two choices? When Rousseau criticizes Europeans for moving to “hot 
countries,” presumably colonies, he states that they become sick because they want to live in 
these countries as they did in Europe. Arguably, then, these people could find a way to live not 
as they did in Europe, which could prevent the sicknesses Rousseau identifies. If an individual 
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wants to live in a place that is very different from where they have previously lived, they must 
lose many of their previous customs and instead adapt to their new living situation. The 
Europeans living in the hot countries must live as people in the hot countries do. Likewise, a 
non-European, “savage” individual would need to live as a European were they to move to 
Europe. Rousseau does not divulge what this entails. It is also uncertain as to whether living in 
civilization, living among rational people, and living in a climate conducive to civilization and 
rationality actually produces rationality in an individual who comes from a non-civilized, non-
rational state. It seems that Rousseau’s concept of perfectibility would allow people to make 
small improvements to their lives, and thus moving to Europe would not ensure full rationality, 
but would perhaps be a step above staying in a non-European country. Yet to achieve even this 
requires as much Europeanization of the individual as possible, whatever that entails.  
 Notwithstanding, Rousseau greatly criticizes his perception of civilization, and insists at 
multiple times that this would not be beneficial for non-Europeans. By no means is Rousseau a 
globalist. Instead, he believes that society corrupts, and different places in the world need 
different types of governments. Yet he also states that the most beneficial governments are only 
fit for those who are truly rational—and European. Consequently, there is a trade-off that would 
be required of the non-European individual. They could possibly achieve full rationality and 
personhood, but at the expense of being corrupted. Even for Rousseau, Europeanization is not a 
goal that is exclusively, or even primarily good. Yet close analysis of his social contract demands 
that this is the end goal, if rationality is the defining feature of personhood, and personhood is 
desirable.  
 Of course, this is not to say that Rousseau believes that it is actually possible for people 
from one region and climate to actually assimilate to the region and climate of another region. 
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His discussions of Europeans moving to “hot” climates and non-Europeans living in temperate 
climates demonstrates that the process of assimilation takes time; it may take generations for a 
group to fully assimilate into a new region. Consequently, Rousseau would believe that it is 
unlikely that people living in the state of nature could enter into civil society soon, if ever.  
 This leads us to the second option: assimilation, and thus full rationality, is not possible 
for the individual. It does not appear that climate causes changes instantly, but rather over a 
period of time. The Europeans that Rousseau criticizes for living in hot countries do not suddenly 
lose their rationality just because they have moved away from civilization. Moreover, Rousseau 
writes of the state of nature, the pre-civilized state, as if it occurred for a relatively lengthy time 
period. While climate impacted when civil society was established and what type of government 
existed, and consequently how close the people of that society could come to rational 
perfectibility, this is not something that instantly occurred after people came to be in the state of 
nature. Instead, it took time for climate to shape people in the way it allegedly did. Consequently, 
just because an individual moves to civilization and abides by the customs of that civilization 
does not mean that that individual will receive the benefits of that civilization. Perfectibility 
should be viewed not as an individual standard, but as a group standard. Thus, in Rousseau’s 
worldview, if a group of Caribbean islanders wished to obtain what Rousseau considers to be 
rationality, they would have to move from their hot country to a temperate one, and live in and 
adapt to civilization. In time, their decedents might begin to become fully rational, although 
Rousseau never guarantees this. Yet even if this were to occur, these people would no longer be 
Caribbean islanders, but rather inhabitants of this temperate, civilized, European state. It 
therefore is impossible to be both non-European and fully rational.  
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 When we consider that perfectibility is not an individual but a group standard that 
develops over long periods of time—as Rousseau speaks about the perfectibility of peoples, not 
individuals—we must consider the prospects for citizenship and if there is even a meaningful 
opportunity for groups to eventually develop rationality over long periods of time. In other 
words, Rousseau’s first social contract and his views on climate have demonstrated that 
assimilation and development of rationality are very difficult, if not impossible, for individuals 
living in non-European territories. But it is the second social contract that formally excludes non-
Europeans from European civil society.  
 In the second social contract, all citizens are equal and may participate in government, 
but not all inhabitants of an area are citizens. Geneva, for example, was broken down into five 
classes of people. If a person from a non-European country moved to Geneva, they would be 
classified as a foreigner. Likewise, if a person from France, for example, moved to Geneva, they 
would also be classified as a foreigner. Foreigners could, in some circumstances, be granted the 
status of bourgeois. Their children could then be citizens, if born inside the city. Rousseau does 
not specify when a foreigner can or should be granted this status, and it is arguably up to the 
sovereign. But let us consider who is more likely to be granted this status in this scenario. The 
person from France, who has lived in a similar climate and is similarly rational, seems to be a 
better candidate for citizenship than the person from a Caribbean island, who is viewed as non-
rational. Rousseau’s citizens are rational, and thus those who are considered non-rational would 
be excluded from citizenship, possibly to the extent that there are no grounds to grant non-
rational foreigners the status of bourgeois. Here, we see that the second social contract’s 
dependence on rationality as a requirement for participation in government effectively excludes 
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non-Europeans from participating in European civil society. Thus, assimilation becomes less and 
less likely, as one cannot assimilate into sphere that one is prohibited from entering. 
  Rousseau has thus divided the world into European/civilized/rational/free and non-
European/savage/non-rational/not-suited-for-freedom. His views on personhood, rationality, and 
climate draw a sharp distinction between European and non-European, but is this a racial 
distinction? This distinction could be purely geographic. Rousseau links rationality to 
nationality, and never explicitly to the color of a person’s skin. Yet, to be European is clearly to 
occupy a privileged status in Rousseau’s framework. To be European is to be civilized and 
rational, to have the capacity to create a just government that allows personal freedoms, and to 
have the best chances of fulfilling perfectibility. To be non-European is to be savage or barbaric, 
(or at the very least, not fully rational), to lack the capacity to create a just government that 
allows certain freedoms, and to have little chance of ever obtaining full rationality, even if an 
attempt is made to assimilate into a European society.  
 It is the fact that perfectibility is a group, not an individual, characteristic that moves 
Rousseau’s framework closer to a racialized worldview. The individual from the Caribbean 
islands lack rationality because of their climate and lack of civilization. They lack rationality 
because they are from a Caribbean island. They lack rationality because they are Caribbean. 
While the distinctions that Rousseau draws begin in physical location and nation of origin, they 
ultimately function as distinctions drawn on race or ethnicity. It is thus fair to state that 
Rousseau’s framework is racialized, and that his social contracts work together to privilege 
Europeans and their decedents over non-Europeans, and to exclude non-Europeans from 
obtaining the rationality that allows Europeans to be privileged.  
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Objections and Responses  
I will now consider two objections to the arguments I have made. The first of these objections 
interacts directly with Rousseau’s theory, but considers his views on personhood and rationality. 
As Rousseau’s arguments regarding personhood and rationality form the basis of my criticism of 
his social contract, looking at this particular objection is appropriate. The second objection to my 
arguments is an external appraisal of Rousseau that argues that his social contract has 
liberationist tendencies, and thus can be appropriated for marronage. If true, this argument would 
arguably mean that an understanding of Rousseau’s social contract as a racialized contract is not 
necessarily the best way to consider the contract’s interaction with race. Instead 
 
Rationality and perfectibility objection 
In his article, “Rousseau, Natural Man, and Race,” Bernard Boxhill argues that despite the fact 
that Rousseau believes that Europeans and non-Europeans currently differ in levels of rationality, 
the concept of perfectibility ultimately demonstrates that everyone can achieve high rational 
capacity.141 Moreover, the distinctions that Rousseau draws between Europeans and non-
Europeans stem not from innate human characteristics, but rather from climate and physical 
location. For these reasons, Boxhill concludes that Rousseau’s thought on personhood and 
rationality is not racist. 
 I agree with Boxhill that Rousseau believes perfectibility is universal, and not just limited 
to one group or another. Yet as previously stated, there is reason to believe that perfectibility is 
not obtained at the individual level, but rather at the social level. For Rousseau, Europeans are 
still rational, even if they move to a hot country. Likewise, individual non-Europeans would still 
                                                 
141 Bernard Boxhill, “Rousseau, Natural Man, and Race,” in Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, ed. Andrew 
Valls (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005) pp. 
 66 
be considered savage and non-rational, even if they moved to a temperate country. Any changes 
that occur must occur with the development of the group as a whole. Because of this, the 
individual’s capacity for perfectibility is ultimately negligible. Individuals cannot achieve full 
rational capacity if they are born into a society that Rousseau thinks lacks full rationality. 
Consequently, non-Europeans are denied full personhood and the chance to assimilate into 
European society—which for Rousseau, would be the only way of obtaining rationality. This 
reading of Rousseau does not address the group component of perfectibility.  
 Boxhill does state, however, that even those who live close to the state of nature express 
rationality in Rousseau’s writings. Boxhill examines the previously mentioned anecdote 
Rousseau includes in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, where the Caribbean man sells 
his bed in the morning only to need it again in the evening. Boxhill writes that this “illustrates 
the Carib’s lack of foresight rather than his lack of intelligence.”142  But this neglects the fact that 
foresight is a crucial component of rationality—not being able to consider plausible outcomes of 
actions seems to be irrational, or non-rational. Likewise, Rousseau uses this passage to 
specifically discuss the lack of rationality people in or near the state of nature have. Thus, 
Boxhill’s reading misconstrues rationality and removes important context from Roussseau’s 
words.  
 Finally, Boxhill argues that any distinctions Rousseau makes regarding rationality and 
intelligence stem from environment, not innate differences among groups of people. Because 
Rousseau was not a biological racist—or one who believes that certain traits are inherent to each 
race, and that there are —Boxhill argues that Roussau’s social contract cannot be racist.  
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 Yet this is an extremely low bar for what racism is. Rousseau’s racialization (and racism) 
is based on climatology, as I have argued and as Boxhill admits. Because of this climatological 
basis for race, Rousseau’s concept of race ultimately acknowledges it as something of a 
construct, something that isn’t innate, but instead something that is shaped by outside elements. 
Yet the consideration of race as a construct does not preclude one from being racist, it just means 
that one’s prejudices are based not on incorrect science and sociology, but on arbitrary 
distinctions. In a way, this may be considered to be an even more pernicious form of racism, as 
the individual who ascribes to such an idea knows that there is no basis to their prejudices, yet 
holds them all the same.  
 
Marronage objection 
The second objection stems not from one particular author, although I shall be addressing one 
specific author’s articulation of the objection, but from a significant school of thought in post-
colonial philosophy. Specifically, some Caribbean post-colonialist philosophers believe that 
Rousseau’s philosophy can be appropriated to support post-colonial liberation movements. This 
is often referred to as the creolization of Rousseau. Liberation movements can entail numerous 
forms and degrees of liberation, from freeing a nation from its colonizers to helping individual 
people forge their identities in the face of erasure. Arguments to this effect can be found from 
many authors writing in post-colonialist and Caribbean philosophical traditions.143 
In his book Fugitive Roussesau, Jimmy Casas Klausen states that Rousseau may be 
appropriated to support marronage, or the process by which one flees from an oppressive 
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environment to forge their identity elsewhere.144 The concept has traditionally been used to 
describe various forms of rebellion undertaken by slaves in the Americas, although Casas 
Klausen extends it to actions taken by any individual of color living in the Americas that helps 
liberate them from racial oppression and erasure. To illustrate his point, Casas Klausen citese the 
settlement established by escaped slaves in the Great Dismal Swamp in North Carolina.145 He 
also describes dancer and actress Josephine Baker, who moved from the segregated South to 
Paris in the 1920s, as an example of his expanded definition of marronage.146  
How does this relate to Rousseau? Simply put, Casas Klausen argues that Rousseau’s 
social contract implies that people ought to seek out the governments and societies that best suit 
them.147 The United States in the 1920s was, to put it very lightly, neither a safe nor supportive 
environment for people of color; Josephine Baker found that she could thrive in Paris, and 
consequently moved to the society that offered her more freedom. Casas Klausen also draws 
upon Rousseau’s other writings that are more oriented on social, rather than political philosophy. 
Casas Klausen especially analyzes Rousseau’s novel Émile, arguing that the book supports the 
idea that travel is necessary to be a good citizen, and to learn which societies are the most 
beneficial and most desirable.148  
I take issue with Casas Klausen’s particular interpretation of Rousseau’s liberationist 
potential. Casas Klausen’s interpretation of Rousseau’s social contract and writings on travel is 
both correct and too basic to be fully accurate. It is true that Rousseau states that different 
governments and societies will be more or less suitable for different people. Yet suitability is tied 
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to the environment the person was born into, as has been previously mentioned. If an individual 
in one European country wished to move to another European country, Rousseau would probably 
agree that this person could possibly become a citizen, or at least assimilate to that society. Yet if 
a person from a non-European country wished to do the same, the influence of their radically 
different environment—and thus, radically different government—would almost certainly 
preclude them from citizenship or assimilation. Even if Rousseau’s social contract were to 
support the idea that people ought to move from place to place, searching for the best form of 
government, his own writings regarding race and climate indicate that for many people, there 
could be no practical benefit from this.  
This is not to say that it is inappropriate to appropriate Rousseau in some capacity. But in 
order for this to be successful, his philosophy must be stripped of the climatology that 
accompanies it. The aspects of his philosophy that criticize despotism and corruption must be 
privileged over his ideas regarding human development and nature. I believe that it is 
conceivable to do this, primarily because philosophers working in the post-colonialist tradition 
have been doing so for decades. Yet to say that this is truly representative of Rousseau’s 
philosophy as a whole is not accurate, which Casas Klausen himself admits, calling his 
interpretation “heretical.”149 In fact, the very notion of creolizing Rousseau depends on 
Rousseau’s philosophy not being accepted as is, but rather being reshaped to fit a more liberating 
narrative. It is thus possible to deracialize and redeem parts of Rousseau’s philosophy; to take it 
at face value, however, is to ascribe to his racialized notions of rationality, personhood, and 
citizenship.  
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The Disappointment of Rawlsian Justice  
John Rawls, who is credited with reviving contractualism in the 20th century, is 
considered to be one of the greatest philosophers of that century, and one of the greatest 
American philosophers. When he was awarding the National Humanities Medal to philosopher 
John Rawls, President Bill Clinton called Rawls “the greatest philosopher of the 20th century” 
and credited him with reviving faith in democracy. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative 
thinktank, argues that Rawls’ theory has shaped American perceptions of equality, and has 
inspired decisions to that effect in multiple branches of government—including the Affordable 
Care Act and US v. Windsor.150 Politicians and policies are often analyzed to see if they are 
Rawlsian.151 The name of John Rawls has been invoked about once a year for the past twenty 
years on the floor of British parliament.152 Rawls’ philosophy is championed (or criticized) as a 
hallmark of liberal, often American egalitarianism. Indeed, Rawls specifically states in A Theory 
of Justice that legalized discrimination based on characteristics such as gender, nationality, race, 
or religion is wrong. And then he stops. 
 I do not think that Rawls would not have wanted to be considered a racist. He would not 
want his philosophy to be considered racist. It seems that Rawls would be concerned about any 
negative racial ramifications of his philosophy, yet when tasked with addressing why he rarely 
even mentioned race in his writings, he would generally state that he was concerned with ideal 
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justice, not racial justice.153 Why is racial justice not a part of ideal justice? Considering this 
question, this chapter will be unique in that it will, at points, attempt to analyze what Rawls did 
not say, whereas the previous chapters have considered the ramifications of what was actually 
written by Locke and Rousseau. 
 Before delving into these arguments, however, there are some cautions we should 
consider. If a philosopher does not address racial concerns, this does not mean that they are racist 
or bigoted—it means that their focus is elsewhere. Notwithstanding, it seems that any theory of 
justice worth its weight ought to address injustice, including racial injustice. Rawls skirts this by 
presenting his theory as an ideal theory, or a standard of justice that ought to be considered the 
most desirable, and a standard that a society ought to be measured by or try to achieve—but as 
an ideal theory, there needn’t be any description of a way of achieving this standard. It should 
also be noted that this is an ideal theory that explicitly condemns racism. Even so, a theory that 
condemns something may not, in practice, actually work to fight that concept.  
 This section will address the implications of Rawls’ theory of ideal justice, specifically 
regarding the colorblindness suggested by a practical or applicable reading of Rawls. This will 
be accompanied by a critique of working within the framework of ideal, versus practical, theory 
itself. Ultimately, I will conclude that while not intentionally or explicitly subordinating, Rawls’ 
philosophy offers little consolation to those concerned with matters of racial justice, that 
attempting to achieve the ideal Rawls has presented is often harmful, and that this last 
consideration should significantly dampen its effect as a complete, useful theory of justice.  
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Artifacts 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed with the intent to end government-sanctioned 
discrimination. The Civil Rights Act prohibits voter discrimination, segregation of public 
facilities, and the refusal to serve people based on their race, ethnicity, or nationality. It 
encourages the abandonment of literacy tests and supports school desegregation.154 This 
landmark piece of legislation has continued to shape the United States since its passage. It would 
later be cited in Supreme Court cases like Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States to prohibit 
racial discrimination by businesses, and in cases like Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County to further address school desegregation. The Civil Rights Act continues to benefit people 
living in the United States. Some, however, hold the belief that the Civil Rights Act “solved” 
racism in the United States. This belief is incorrect and, in many cases, harmful.  
In 1978, shortly after Rawls published his first major work, A Theory of Justice, 
sociologist William Julius Wilson published one of his first major works, The Declining 
Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions. This work proved to be 
controversial, as Wilson argued that economic status as opposed to race is a greater determinate 
of one’s position in society.155 Wilson addressed the claims that racial discrimination is still 
rampant in American society in the epilogue to the second addition of his book. He 
acknowledges that racism still exists, but concludes, “Many blacks and white liberals have yet to 
recognize that the problem of economic dislocation is more central to the plight of the black poor 
than is the problem of purely racial discrimination.”156 He additionally writes that if the impacts 
of past discrimination are accounted for, current African Americans are disadvantaged almost 
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solely through economic means.157 The problem that many had with Wilson’s argument is that, 
while it acknowledge both past and present racism, it seemingly implied that concerns specific to 
people of color, especially African Americans, could be mitigated primarily through economic 
means. This seemed to ignore problems directly caused by prejudice—both explicit racism and 
actions caused by unrealized, subconscious biases.  
 The third artifact—not so much an artifact, as this incident is less than a year old—is 
anecdotal. While attending an undergraduate philosophy conference in the fall of 2018, I listened 
to several of my peers present their papers. The first speaker jokingly commented that his paper 
was first in order to get the controversial subjects out of the way—his paper was about race in 
America. He argued that racism is still prevalent in American society, using data regarding 
sentencing rates, economic power, and political representation to support his points. As I 
listened, I wondered what could possibly be controversial about acknowledging that racism still 
exists in almost every sphere of contemporary American life. I received my answer when the 
speaker entered the question and answer period of his presentation. Another undergraduate posed 
the first question, asking, “What would you say to someone like me, who believes that the 
abolition of slavery and the passage of the Civil Rights Act have mitigated any racial biases in 
the United States?” The speaker referred the questioner to the statistics he had cited in his 
presentation, which clearly outlined a pattern of discriminate behaviors. 
 Striving for significant solutions to racial injustices is essential. Yet it is highly unlikely 
that one single change, no matter how monumental, will solve such a complicated problem. Just 
as the abolition of slavery gave way to legalized racial discrimination, the abolition of legalized 
racial discrimination gave way to subtler ways of disenfranchising people of color, including 
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through sentencing procedures, housing covenants, and educational inequalities. The progress 
that has been made regarding racial justice should be celebrated, but it should not be considered 
a stopping point. Progress does not mean that a problem is solved, or that we now live in a post-
racial society where colorblind laws are applied in a truly neutral, or even beneficial way. Yet the 
attitude that racial considerations are best addressed through neutral, colorblind laws that do not 
directly tackle racial issues exists in some contemporary interpretations of Rawls’ social contract 
and philosophy. These will be discussed later in this piece.  
 
Rawls’ Social Contract 
Before exploring Rawls’ social contract, it will be useful to identify what “justice” is for him. 
For Rawls, justice is “the first virtue of social institutions,”158 and justice is defined as fairness. 
This is the ideal form of justice, and consequently, Rawls devotes hundreds of pages to 
describing ideal justice, but not how to achieve it or how to keep it. Works like A Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism exist to define and justify Rawls’ understanding of justice, and 
to defend why it is the best concept of justice.  
As mentioned, Rawls identifies justice as fairness. This requires a consideration of what 
fairness is. Rawls states that a system is fair, and therefore just, if it is bound by an original 
agreement entered into by the members of the system.159 This original agreement is ultimately 
theoretical and is facilitated by the veil of ignorance.160 This famous thought experiment of 
Rawls’ requires the individual—or in the case of a society, the group responsible for ordering the 
society—to imagine themselves stepping behind a veil, and imagine a society that they will 
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enter. While those behind the veil know that those in that society are have ends and wish to 
achieve them, and that they have some concept of the good. Yet they know nothing else about 
this society, including its past or present state. They do not know when in time or where in space 
the society exists, or what types of people live in it. They also lack any knowledge about how 
they will enter this society:  
The parties are not allowed to know the social position of those they represent, or the 
particular comprehensive doctrine of the person each represents. The same idea is 
extended to information about people’s race and ethnic group, sex and gender, and their 
various native endowments such as strength and intelligence, all within the normal 
range.161  
 
From this original position of complete ignorance, the individual or group is asked to determine 
which rules they would choose to help govern the society.  
 Rawls believes that from behind the veil of ignorance, one would reasonably choose two 
broad principles by which to guide society. The agreement reach behind the veil is Rawls’ 
version of the social contract. The principles are intended for societies and governments, not 
individuals in their day-to-day lives.162 The actor(s) behind the veil will want to ensure that they 
may be as well-off as possible in the society into which they will enter. Being cautious and risk 
averse, the actor will choose two principles are designed to help the most disadvantaged 
members in any given society.163  
The first principle guarantees “requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and 
duties.”164 These basic rights include political liberties, such as voting and holding public office; 
freedom of speech, assembly, thought, and religion; the right to hold property; and the right to 
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resist arbitrary arrest, searches, and seizures.165 It is under this principle that the few, but explicit, 
references to anti-discrimination may apply. Neither a group nor government may exercise their 
liberty to the extent that they persecute others.166 Finally, this first principle of justice is 
prioritized. If it ever comes into conflict with the second principle of justice, the first principle is 
given preference.167 Consequently, the first principle is designed to achieve absolute equality of 
treatment and opportunity.  
The second principle of justice, sometimes called the difference principle, describes how  
the resources and power of a society should be distributed. This principle states that 
Social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are 
just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the 
least advantaged members of society.168  
 
This principle also states that all positions and offices must be open to everyone in the society.169 
Thus, this principle allows inequalities only if they result in benefits for those who would 
otherwise be disadvantaged because of these inequalities, and society as a whole would be better 
off with these inequalities than with a state of perfect equality. For instance, wealth inequalities 
might be allowed if such inequalities resulted in the creation of better-paying jobs that were held 
by people on the lower end of the wealth gap, or if this resulted in the taxation of the wealthy for 
the purpose of funding programs designed to help those who are not wealthy.  
Regarding this principle, Rawls addressing some concerns about unequal treatment. He 
specifically discusses treatment based on sex, race, and culture, and states that inequalities of 
these types are permissible if and only if the difference somehow creates a more preferable 
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distribution of primary social goods.170 It is unlikely that unequal treatment based on immutable, 
if socially construed, characteristics would create a more preferable distribution of goods—this 
seems like a paradox. Thus, it is unlikely that a just society would ultimately permit different 
levels of treatment for different groups.  
The individuals who step behind the veil of ignorance who allegedly identify and support 
these principles are, as previously mentioned, completely unaware of the society to which they 
will be entering. They are also unaware of who they are, both when they enter into the society 
and when they are behind the veil. What they do know is that they are moral, rational beings, and 
they want to be able to exist, thrive, and achieve their ends in whichever society they enter, no 
matter in which position they enter it.171 As stated, the two principles apply not to the people 
who uncover them, but to established entities, such as governments and the basic structures of 
society, which Rawls defines as (DEFINITION). 
Ultimately, if one were to attempt to create a society that mirrors Rawls’ ideal just 
society, that society would have laws and structures that apply to people neutrally and without 
regards to any defining characteristics they might have. Rawls writes that in an ideally just 
society, authorities “should be impartial and not influenced by personal, monetary, or other 
irrelevant considerations in their handling of particular cases.”172 Racially speaking, the 
government would legally not consider a person’s race when interacting them. It might even be 
the case that in a Rawlsian society, race would not exist—an arbitrary social construct with the 
potential to cause harm and inequality would not align with the first principle of justice.   
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Is Ideal Theory Ideal? 
It must be reiterated that Rawls is writing ideal theory, not practical theory. On one hand, Rawls’ 
philosophy seems to have inspired the actions of numerous American civil servants, and so his 
intention of ideal theory does not necessarily matter, as the interpretation is often practical. The 
uptake of Rawls’ writings is necessary to consider. On the other hand, we cannot discount the 
intentions of authors themselves. Rawls did not intend his theory to be practical or applicable, 
but rather to explain an ideal, the purest form of the value of justice. Consequently, he should not 
be blamed for other people erroneously interpreting and inappropriately using his theory. 
If this argument is to be bought, then it comes with the acknowledgement that Rawls’ 
theory of justice is purely ideal. This eventually becomes clear from Rawls’ writings. While in A 
Theory of Justice, he will sometimes write in a way that is suggestive of practicality—by saying 
“arrangements can be made just,”173 for instance—he ultimately clarifies that A Theory of Justice 
is purely ideal. In Political Liberalism, one of his last major works, he states “The aims of [A 
Theory of Justice] were to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional 
doctrine of the social contact.”174 Consequently, analyzing Rawls’ theory as he meant it to be 
intended will produce a different line of argumentation than analyzing how some of Rawls’ 
readers interpreted his works, as we shall see later.  
But reading Rawls’ social contract as ideal opens up a new set of problems pertaining to 
race. Specifically, it seems that an ideal theory may not actually be a useful theory, as it does 
nothing to demonstrate how the theory is ever to be achieved. It has no practical implications for 
racial justice, especially as racial justice does not seem to be part of the overall Rawlsian 
framework. As he does not provide arguments for producing justice in a non-ideal society, Rawls 
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has little to offer anyone who seeks to address injustices. Ai-Thu Dang, an economist 
specializing in the economics of Rawlsian liberalism, states that Rawls understood that his work 
lacked practical application for matters of racial justice, but ended up stating, “This is indeed an 
omission in Theory; but an omission is not as such a fault, either in that work’s agenda or in its 
conception of justice.”175  
Moreover, the very nature of ideal theory seems to abstract it from reality. Rawls 
describes an ideally just society where all people have some basic understanding of the good, and 
generally follow the just rules that the just government has established. Moreover, the social 
contract established in the original position behind the veil of ignorance is entirely imaginary—
the veil, of course, does not exist. Sheila Foster, a legal scholar specializing in critical theory and 
environmentalism, writes that “The abstract individual in the original position is very difficult for 
race scholars to reconcile with the historical and continuing reality of racial subordination.”176 In 
other words, biases and prejudices are so entrenched into society that it would be impossible for 
a person to ever meet the ideal of truly being behind the veil of ignorance—I may try to step 
behind the veil, but the biases that I unknowingly carry with me will also be behind the veil with 
me. Of course, this is probably not a problem for Rawls, as the actors in ideal theory are 
themselves ideal—but also nonexistent. By presenting a theory that is neither applicable to nor 
achievable in reality, Rawls’ theory of justice would do very little for actual people, societies, 
and governments.  
Charles Mills adds to this argument by arguing that Rawls’ theory of justice does not 
address racial justice because the choice to create an ideal theory was a function of Rawls’ own 
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privilege.177 Affluent, highly educated, white, and male, Rawls faced little discrimination or 
prejudice in his life. His theory of justice does not address issues that did not touch him. Mills 
considers ideal theory an ideology in and of itself, one that represents “a distortional complex of 
ideas, values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the non-representative interests and experience of a 
small minority of the national population—middle- to upper-class white males.”178 
Consequently, the actual structure and purpose of Rawls’ philosophy reinforces divisions that 
already exist.  
Ultimately, an ideal reading of Rawls is ultimately a wonderful, if lengthy, exploration of 
one concept of justice—but nothing more. It provides no mechanism to address racial justice, 
and thus should not be considered an appropriate mechanism or theoretical basis to do so. This, 
of course, is an objection to all ideal theory, not just Rawls’ philosophy. In general, if one is 
concerned about achieving social justice in reality, ideal theory can be of some use in its 
description of a desirable world. Notwithstanding, ideal theory, in a vacuum, provides little 
utility. Martin Luther King described an ideal world but considered practical methods to achieve 
that world. Using Rawls’ ideal theory by itself to try to achieve racial justice does nothing—but 
is it possible to use Rawls’ philosophy as inspiration to elicit change through practical means? I 
argue that it is not. 
 
Rawls and Colorblindness 
As previously stated, Rawls’ ideal world appears to be one where the government and the basic 
structures of society do not consider a person’s race at all regarding the distribution of goods. 
This society may even be post-racial or raceless; if so, race would not be ignored by social 
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institutions and the government—it would not exist as a construct at all. This sort of thinking 
may, on paper, seem harmless or even beneficial. Indeed, colorblindness was important to the 
Civil Rights Movement, and Martin Luther King Jr.’s call for people to be judged on the contents 
of their characters seems to support a colorblind worldview.179 Additionally, it is well-
established in critical race theory that race is a construct created to subordinate. It seems that a 
society without this arbitrary distinction should be desirable. Yet when colorblindness is cited in 
contemporary discourses on race, it is often used with the false understanding that we already 
exist in a post-racial world. In other words, this is a world where racism no longer exists, race 
itself has been deconstructed, and consequently everyone is free to be judged for their merits, not 
based on the color of their skin, which is not a consideration at all.  
While this is an admirable world to strive for, it is inappropriate to believe that that is the 
world in which we currently exist. Rampant inequalities in housing, employment, wages, 
sentencing, political representation, business ownership, media representation, etc. show that 
whiteness is still hegemonic in the western, liberal world. It is all very well for an individual to 
not discriminate based on a person’s race, but this does nothing to address the systemic 
inequalities that exist in a given society. Even if all present systemic inequalities were erased, 
this would not address the massive disadvantages that a group faced historically, and how these 
impacted their present.  
A society that attempts to be colorblind—in an effort to mirror Rawlsian equality—but 
has not resolved past and present racial inequalities is harmful. Examples of this are prevalent, 
especially in the United States legal system. Due to concerns about discriminate sentencing 
procedures, courts and legislators created new policies that attempted to be as racially neutral as 
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possible. Consequently, mandatory minimums, three-strikes laws, and strict criteria for capital 
punishment were all enacted with the written intent to decrease racial bias in the criminal justice 
system; they have not been successful and instead, have led to higher sentences for defendants, 
especially defendants of color.180 This is the case because even laws that claim to be neutral and 
colorblind do not address the racially biased people circulating around these laws—the people 
who implement them.  
This may also be seen in the United States regarding affirmative action. In the 2007 
Supreme Court case Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, the 
Court struck down government-mandated affirmative action programs. Previously, affirmative 
action had been used to racially integrate schools, especially by bringing students of color into 
predominately white schools, which often were better funded and therefore offered a better 
educational opportunity. Chief Justice John Roberts concisely expressed a colorblind attitude in 
his concluding statement to the majority opinion: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of 
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”181 In other words, giving preferential 
treatment to one race over another is always wrong, regardless of whether or not that treatment is 
designed to rectify past wrongs and inequalities. Chief Justice Roberts seems to equivocate the 
systemic exclusion of black children and young adults from affluent white schools with 
prioritizing (but not demanding) admission for black children and young adults into these same 
schools. This attitude, that all race-based considerations are equivalent, allows existing systemic 
flaws to linger or even worsen.  
While we ought to strive for a world where programs such as affirmative action are no 
longer necessary, getting rid of programs such as affirmative action are not the way to achieve 
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that world. Doing so does not address the problems that made the program necessary in the first 
place. The ramifications of a social construct must be addressed, not ignored. A theory that 
describes a society that is colorblind and may very well be raceless is useless for a society with 
race.  
 
Objection 
Tommie Shelby, scholar of African and African American studies, disagrees. Shelby believes 
that Rawls provides an appropriate framework for addressing racial concerns within his theory, 
stating that the theory rules out “most if not all familiar forms of racial injustice.”182 This is 
because Rawls specifically states that discrimination is wrong, such as when he writes, “We are 
confident that religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust.”183 Because he makes 
such statements, it must follow that his theory will protect against racial injustice.  
It is because of statements such as these that I think it is inappropriate to call Rawls a 
racist, whereas we can feel more confident applying the term to Locke or Rousseau. Rawls states 
that discrimination based on race is wrong, and then moves on. If there is a grey area between 
racism and working to prevent and undo racism, Rawls exists in this area. This does not mean 
that his theory of justice and the social contract that supports it actually create justice for all—in 
fact, the opposite seems to be true, in practicality, the theory provides no good way for 
addressing racial injustices, and ideally, the theory does nothing for any injustices that exist in 
reality.  
                                                 
182 Tommie Shelby, “Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations,” Fordham Law Review 72, no. 5 (2004): 
1697.  
183 Rawls, Theory of Justice, 19.  
 84 
 But Shelby also contests that Rawls’ theory provides arguments for governments to enact 
fair and neutral policies that will prevent arbitrary discrimination on behalf of the government—
Shelby reads a practical component into the theory of justice.184 Additionally, it is not a flaw in 
Rawls’ theory that individual people, who may still have racial biases, are not addressed, because 
suitable just laws will prevent these biases from becoming harmful.  
The existence of individual racism can be an obstacle to any person's effective choice and 
active pursuit of a rational plan of life under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
So, while the fact that some individuals harbor racist attitudes would still be a moral 
problem of some concern, were the overall system of social cooperation a just one or 
nearly so, this disturbing problem would not be such an urgent practical matter from the 
standpoint of disfavored racial groups.185 
 
Rawls agrees with this premise, and specifically states that one must judge whether or not an 
institution, society, or government is just or unjust based on its aggregate— “One or several rules 
of an arrangement may be unjust without the institution itself being so. Similarly, an institution 
may be unjust although the social system as a whole is not.”186 Consequently, if individual 
people are racist, this does not mean that the system as a whole will cause racial subordination, 
discrimination, or exclusion. 
Yet systemic, individual racism does exist. And in reality, it certainly does matter. 
Shelby’s real-world application of Rawls must be analyzed in the context of the real world. 
Foster states, “As critical race scholars have powerfully argued, race/racism is not something that 
can easily be rendered ‘irrelevant’ or neutralized.”187 Thus, even if a law is created with the 
intention of neutrality, those interpreting and applying the law are those who actually determine 
if the law is neutral. There is nothing innately racist about sentencing people to death, for 
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instance, but in the United States, when black men are sentenced to death more than any other 
demographic group, a neutral policy is shown to have been applied in non-neutral ways. Dang 
further argues that by ignoring biased actors, Rawls “fails to see that public reason can be 
distorted by racial stereotypes, faulty opinion formation and racially structured group 
interests.”188 Even if we are to believe that Rawls provides proper mechanisms for creating a set 
of just laws, this does not ensure a just government or just society, because governments and 
societies are made up of not just laws, but also people—and people may be unjust.  
--- 
 Rawls’ social contract and the theory of justice that accompanies it do not offer recourse 
for concerns regarding racial injustice. The intended, ideal reading offers no consolation because 
of its of its inaccessibility: it offers no assistance for achieving its lofty goals, and actually 
describes a society entirely abstracted from reality. Someone who seeks to address racial 
inequalities will find little guidance from Rawls’ social contract and theory of justice. Yet people 
continue to attempt to apply Rawls’ theory to policy decisions and legal procedures, resulting in 
actions that purport to be colorblind. Yet colorblindness fails in a society that has not already 
achieved racial equality, for colorblind policies neither abate engrained biases nor undo previous 
inequalities.  
When we consider the inefficacy of idea theory alongside a practical reading of Rawls, 
which results in seeing justice as colorblind, it appears that neither reading offers an appropriate 
way of evaluating racial concerns. While colorblindness and, later, a post-racial society may be 
admirable goals for the future, they are currently false visions of the present that result in policies 
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that can do more harm than good to the people they were designed to help. Using Rawls to try to 
achieve racial justice in a non-ideal world is unviable. 
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